Negotiate and wait: Egypt’s limited options over Ethiopia’s Renaissance Dam

“Construction of the Renaissance Dam is complete.” With these words, Ethiopia announced the inauguration date of the dam this coming September and invited Egypt and Sudan to attend the opening ceremony.

Khartoum has yet to respond to Ethiopia’s invitation, which comes 18 months after the collapse of tripartite negotiations, which dragged on since construction began in 2011 without producing an agreement. Cairo, meanwhile, dismissed the invitation as “nonsense,” according to Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty.

But as the country most acutely affected by the project, Egypt finds its options increasingly constrained, even as the threat of water poverty grows. Experts told Al Manassa that Cairo’s choices to resolve the impasse are largely limited to diplomacy, ruling out military options in the foreseeable future.

Although Egypt accuses Addis Ababa of derailing negotiations and violating the 2015 Declaration of Principles by unilaterally filling the dam, Cairo has not abandoned diplomatic or mediation efforts. It remains hopeful of securing an agreement that protects its water rights, and has consistently pushed for a binding deal at every opportunity, most recently at the BRICS summit in Brazil earlier this month.

Has Egypt been harmed by the dam?

Before exploring Egypt’s options, it is important to assess the scale and nature of the damage it has already sustained. Ethiopia’s prime minister claims the dam has not impacted water flow to Egypt’s High Dam during the filling process, noting that Egypt has not lost a single liter of its annual 55.5 billion cubic meter share of Nile water.

But Abbas Sharaki, a professor of geology and water resources at Cairo University, challenges this narrative. “The Ethiopian dam has stored 60 billion cubic meters since last September, in addition to another 20 to 30 billion cubic meters that have either evaporated or seeped away since filling began in 2020,” he told Al Manassa. “This water would have otherwise reached the downstream countries. The damage has already occurred, even if citizens or farmers haven’t felt it yet, due to abundant rainfall and the state’s preparedness.”

Sharaki listed Egypt’s efforts to mitigate the negative impacts of the filling, including spending about 500 billion pounds (roughly $9.9 billion) on water infrastructure projects. These include the reuse of agricultural drainage water, expanded reliance on groundwater, reductions in water-intensive crops, and a slower pace to their exports. Together, these steps have softened the blow of reduced water availability for both drinking and farming.

Still, the real concern lies in prolonged droughts that could drastically limit Egypt’s water supply. This is the core disagreement between Cairo and Addis Ababa, since no mechanism exists to regulate the post-construction phase or guarantee water shares for Egypt and Sudan.

A particularly bleak forecast emerged from a recent study by researchers at Texas A&M University, which found that Egypt’s share of Nile water could drop by as much as 35.47% during drought years while the Ethiopian dam is being filled. Such a decline could cause Egypt to lose a third of its agricultural land each year during these periods.

Sharaki, however, is not alarmed by these projections, calling them exaggerated. Drought naturally affects both countries’ water shares, he explained. In such scenarios, Ethiopia would have to cut back electricity production without continuing to fill the reservoir at the same pace. He added that coordination would be necessary to minimize any potential risks if a drought persisted beyond seven years.

While technical concerns remain, the heart of the dispute is political, centered on Ethiopia’s bid to dominate the Nile. The real fear, Sharaki warned, is that Ethiopia and other regional states may eventually build more dams, eroding Egypt’s already vulnerable share of the river.

Egypt negotiates and waits

Egypt will continue pursuing a diplomatic solution, both regionally and internationally, to reach a binding agreement, according to Amani El-Taweel, director of the African Affairs Program at the Al-Ahram Center for Strategic Studies.

El-Taweel believes that water security remains a top priority for Egyptian policymakers. However, successive governments may have been overly optimistic in assuming their diplomatic leverage could sway Ethiopia before the dam’s completion.

Speaking to Al Manassa, El-Taweel stressed that Egypt’s next moves will depend heavily on Ethiopia’s position. If Addis Ababa maintains its intransigence, the international community will increasingly view the completed dam as a threat—not just to Egypt, but to human security, natural water rights, and environmental risks in case of its collapse.

“It has also become clear that Ethiopia lacks the capacity to effectively harness the water stored in the dam,” she added. “This weakens its credibility on the international stage.”

The frequent remarks by US President Donald Trump on the dangers of the dam have added a new layer to the issue. Trump has claimed that the US funded the dam despite knowing its threat to Egypt’s lifeline, and has also suggested he could resolve the dispute.

Trump’s comments appear aimed at reviving the US-brokered mediation efforts that collapsed in 2019 when Ethiopia accused Washington of siding with Egypt. While Egypt welcomed Trump’s recent statements, Addis Ababa rejected them.

Trump’s recent statements, according to former Egyptian Assistant Foreign Minister Maasoum Marzouk, should be read differently given current regional conditions. Marzouk told Al Manassa that Trump sees himself as a successful negotiator, but the geopolitical climate will shape his ability to intervene. Ultimately, he suggested, Trump may use the dam issue as a bargaining chip to pressure Egypt into accepting the displacement of Palestinians.

“He won’t strike the dam for us,” Marzouk added. “At best, he’ll apply pressure to reach an agreement that protects Egypt during droughts—something our diplomats can achieve without his help.”

However Salah Halima, vice president of the Egyptian Council for African Affairs, took a different view. He sees Washington as the most capable mediator at present and argues that Trump had previously secured a deal in 2019, from which Ethiopia walked away at the last minute, as had happened in previous talks.

Halima rejected any link between the dam dispute and the Gaza conflict, citing Egypt’s longstanding opposition to Palestinian displacement. Egypt will not compromise its stance, even under pressure, he stated.

He also raised the prospect of returning to the UN Security Council to assert Egypt’s historical rights to the Nile and to highlight the downstream impact of the dam. If the dam poses an existential threat, Egypt could invoke principles related to peaceful dispute resolution under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, as well as the right to self-defense under Article 51 of Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression).

Egypt could also cite Trump’s past warnings about the dam’s potential to leave Egyptians without water, and his acknowledgment of Egypt’s right to strike the dam if it faces an existential threat.

Cairo has turned to the Security Council several times during periods of negotiation deadlock. However, the Council has so far merely urged all three countries to continue talks without issuing any binding resolution. With African Union-led negotiations now effectively dead, Egypt informed the Council in 2024 that talks had collapsed and accused Addis Ababa of using negotiations to legitimize its unilateral and unlawful actions.

Will Egypt resort to military action?

Whenever talks break down, the question of military intervention surfaces. But Cairo is acutely aware of the risks involved and avoids public threats, even as officials repeatedly assert Egypt’s right to defend its water interests and declare water security a red line.

In 2020, President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi asked local media to refrain from discussing military options. He emphasized that the diplomatic struggle would be long but ultimately successful—an indication that military action is not currently on the table for the Egyptian leadership.

“The military option will always remain a last resort,” said Marzouk. “But it’s far more complicated than some suggest. Bombing a civilian infrastructure project like the dam would provoke international outrage and alienate countries that helped fund its construction, including Arab states with ties to Addis Ababa.

It could also trigger a protracted war of attrition with a country that possesses missiles, and whose army might be supplied with more advanced military technologies to strike your vital installations, like the High Dam itself.”

Marzouk warned that if the crisis reaches a point where Egyptians are dying of thirst or unable to farm their land, the situation could escalate into what he termed “a form of genocide.” In such a scenario, “Egypt would have no choice but to act in self-defense.”

Despite the long and complex negotiations with Ethiopia, Marzouk does not believe all diplomatic avenues have been exhausted. “There are no lost causes—only bad lawyers,” he said. Egypt, he argued, still has many tools at its disposal, from economic pressure to a shift from soft to hard diplomacy.

That shift would involve replacing the current negotiation team and adopting a more assertive, strategic approach to compel Ethiopia to sign an agreement that addresses Egypt’s and Sudan’s concerns.