Trump, the Nile, and the Zionist dream

Each time US President Donald Trump raises the issue of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam/GERD, I am reminded of a passage from his book, “The Art of the Deal”, in which he advises novice investors to “maximize your options.”

Trump argues that even the most promising deals tend to fail, so success requires preparing at least half a dozen fallback strategies—because, as he puts it, anything is possible.

On Friday, July 18, Trump addressed the Renaissance Dam dispute for the third time in less than a month. Reiterating his concern that the dam poses a significant threat to Egypt’s water security, he blamed the previous Democratic administration for having financed and enabled the project. He claimed coordination with Cairo was underway and spoke vaguely of a “pretty long-term” solution—without providing further details.

Ethiopia responded with indignation. Egypt, in contrast, issued a more measured statement, calling for a fair agreement that protects the interests of all parties, while welcoming Trump’s assertion that the Nile remains Egypt’s sole source of life. Yet the official responses from both countries reflected a deeper reality: there appears to be no meaningful dialogue with Washington as Ethiopia prepares to inaugurate the dam this summer.

The Nile and Gaza: A transactional bargain?

Against this backdrop, it is not unreasonable to connect Trump’s comments on the dam to broader regional developments—most notably, Gaza. The issue had not featured on his public agenda during his second term until it became relevant to a potential ceasefire deal between Israel and Iran. That moment was soon followed by Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu’s visit to Washington, the public resurfacing of proposals for a so-called humanitarian city, and renewed media advocacy from pro-Israel outlets promoting longstanding ideas to either relocate the Palestinian population of Gaza into Egypt’s Sinai Peninsula or place the territory under Egyptian control.

Trump appeared to be laying the groundwork for a perilous trade-off: Nile water security in exchange for Egypt’s complicity—whether in the form of accepting the displacement of Palestinians into Sinai, assuming administrative control over Gaza, or, at a minimum, becoming further entangled in a resolution favorable to Netanyahu.

Such a resolution would aim to eliminate resistance, subdue Gaza permanently, or facilitate its incremental absorption by Israel, mirroring developments in the West Bank. These scenarios, while alarming, remain within the realm of political imagination embraced by Israel’s most influential supporters.

Trump’s recent posture is not an aberration—it reflects the worldview captured in his book: plan for success across multiple fronts, knowing that only some options will come to fruition.

A Longstanding position

To understand Trump’s stance, it is important to recall his consistent opposition to the dam project during his first term. In 2020, as Ethiopia commenced its first unilateral filling of the dam, Trump ordered a reduction of $130 million in US aid to Addis Ababa. This was viewed as a rare instance of Washington penalizing an African state over Nile-related negotiations.

Trump’s interest in African affairs had previously seemed minimal. Thus, his open warning shortly afterwards was all the more surprising. Speaking publicly about Sudan’s prospective normalization with Israel, Trump remarked—almost in passing—that “Egypt will end up blowing up the dam,” adding “I said it and I say it loud and clear … they’ll blow up that dam. And they have to do something.”

It’s highly probable that Trump solely blamed Addis Ababa for the failure of the Washington negotiations. At the time, Trump was personally overseeing the US-brokered negotiations, with Treasury Secretary Steven Mnuchin and World Bank officials taking part. Ethiopia eventually withdrew, accusing the US of abandoning its role as mediator and aligning with Egypt’s legal and diplomatic framing of the dispute.

What more Trump could have done to influence Ethiopia remains unclear. His administration’s aggressive stance only reinforced Ethiopian skepticism, validating a nationalist narrative that painted US involvement as neocolonial interference. In Addis Ababa’s telling, historical water rights treaties—dating back to the colonial era—were skewed in favor of Egypt and must now be corrected.

Such arguments have gained traction in Western academic and policy circles, including in the US and Europe. They were also reflected in the Biden administration’s more conciliatory approach. Upon taking office, Biden lifted the aid freeze, and disengaged from the dam negotiations, refocusing instead on Ethiopia’s civil war in Tigray. His administration issued only vague diplomatic statements, and Egypt had to turn to the failed African Union–led mediation.

The net result was to create space for Ethiopia to complete construction and successive fillings of the dam, effectively removing international constraints.

A broader agenda?

When Trump claims that the US funded the project, he is not referring to direct financial support. Rather, he is pointing to a broader context: the Biden administration’s disengagement and its implicit signaling that the US would not obstruct Ethiopia’s efforts. Since Egypt’s appeal to the UN Security Council in July 2021, the diplomatic track has cooled. The conflict in Tigray that lasted for two years absorbed most US attention, and Egypt found itself navigating the crisis alone.

But Trump’s comments may also reflect deeper ambitions. One plausible interpretation is that he is using the dam dispute as leverage in other negotiations, such as his broader Middle East policy, or his desire to present himself once again as a candidate for the Nobel Peace Prize.

More provocatively, there are echoes of an older Zionist aspiration: the redirection of Nile waters to Israel.

The Nile-to-Israel pipeline: From fantasy to folly

The idea of diverting Nile water to Israel is not a recent invention. In 1903, during a visit to Egypt, Theodor Herzl proposed to the British colonial authorities and the government of Khedive Abbas Helmy II the creation of a Jewish homeland in northern Sinai, to be designated “The Egyptian Province of Judea,” under a 99-year concession.

This proposal included full sovereign rights for Herzl over the designated territory, with future negotiations anticipated regarding the delivery of Nile water—a prospect that Egypt rejected outright on the grounds that it would entail altering the natural course of the river.

The late renowned journalist Kamel Zoheiry devoted a chapter of his book The Nile in Danger to documenting this episode.

The concept resurfaced during the early phase of Egyptian-Israeli normalization. In September 1979, during a visit to Haifa, President Anwar Sadat reportedly told Begin, “Why not send you some fresh water to the Negev? You are good neighbors.” Israeli and American newspapers interpreted the remark as a breakthrough. But the comment was omitted from Egyptian coverage.

The alarm only truly sounded when Egypt began digging the Peace Canal in November 1979. A month later, in December, October magazine published a report titled “The New Zamzam Project,” citing Sadat’s directives to deliver Nile water to Jerusalem, to be accessible to worshipers visiting the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the Dome of the Rock, the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, and the Western Wall.

He was quoted as saying, “We will make this water a contribution from the Egyptian people, in the name of hundreds of millions of Muslims, in commemoration of the peace initiative.”

The backlash was immediate and fierce. Parliamentarians, newspapers, and political parties condemned the idea. Dr. Naemat Ahmed Fouad, writing in Al-Shaab newspaper, called it “a matter of life and death,” warning against “the cultivation and prosperity of the Negev, the qualitative imbalance, the entrenchment of Israel and its expansion towards Sinai and into Arab oil locations, and the encirclement of Egypt and Saudi Arabia.”

After Sadat’s assassination, the proposal faded. His successor, Hosni Mubarak, never pursued it. Egypt has since maintained a firm stance against any reduction in its share of Nile water and any upstream projects that affect flow. This position was reinforced by the severe drought that struck the Ethiopian Highlands in 1979.

At the time, Egypt was forced to draw heavily on its High Dam reserves, which dropped to crisis levels—a fact highlighted in a US intelligence report issued in 1986. Rainfall did not return to sustainable levels until late summer 1985.

The Case for Reasserting National Agency

Setting aside Israeli interests, Trump may see the GERD dispute as yet another opportunity to bolster his case for a Nobel Peace Prize, or as a pressure point to extract quick diplomatic wins for his administration. He may also view it as a convenient flashpoint for stirring tensions within the BRICS bloc, to which both Egypt and Ethiopia belong, particularly amid concerns about their potential future cooperation in ways that could diminish US influence in favor of China.

Yet since the signing of the Declaration of Principles in 2015, there has been no talk of any developmental cooperation based on joint and coordinated operation of the dam. 

But for Egypt, the matter is existential. It is not a subject for global negotiation or regional trade-offs. The dam poses a direct threat to the Nile, the country’s lifeline, and to the 100 million Egyptians who already live below the water poverty line.

The time for diplomatic passivity has passed. With final negotiations stalled and the dam’s operation imminent, Egypt must seize the initiative. As Foreign Ministry spokesman Badr Abdelatty has repeatedly stated, the right to self-defense remains intact.

The country must now act across all diplomatic, legal, and economic fronts to assert its rights. Only such action will confer binding status on any future agreement—one that ensures joint management of the dam, coordination during droughts, and real safeguards for downstream states. Egypt must not wait for Trump, or anyone else, to validate its options.