Netanyahu’s Somaliland gamble: Israel’s new frontier in the Horn of Africa
In the fall of 2024, when global attention was fixed on the genocide in Gaza and the search for a humanitarian truce, PM Benjamin Netanyahu was conferring with his military commanders on how to effectively counter Houthi threats. The Israeli military and intelligence had delivered lethal strikes against the so-called “Axis of Resistance” in Iran, Lebanon, Syria, and Palestine. But on its southern fronts, the Houthis, who Israeli leaders had not deemed a credible threat, now proved to be a group with far more consequential capabilities than previously conceived.
Meanwhile, Turkey was moving to finalize a de-escalation framework between Ethiopia and Somalia that included suspending the January 2024 memorandum of understanding signed by Addis Ababa and the secessionist Somaliland administration in the northwestern federal Somalia. The 2024 agreement had promised Ethiopia a 50-year maritime outlet and military base in Berbera in exchange for the East African nation’s formal recognition of Somaliland.
The agreement, endorsed by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, ensured Ethiopia’s “secure” access to sea via Somali territory while maintaining Addis Ababa’s recognition of Somalia’s unity. Shortly thereafter, presidential elections in Somaliland resulted in a landslide victory for Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi, commonly referred to as Irro, of the Somaliland National Party, Waddani.
Meanwhile, various voices in the Israeli media began emphasizing the importance of monitoring Turkey’s expansionist strategy in East Africa, which they described as being driven by religious and cultural affinities. In response, they proposed the establishment of an active presence in Somaliland following the suspension of the Ethiopian memorandum. Some studies explicitly advocated for using this strategic region to “achieve a decisive victory” over the Houthis.
This proposal was not an outlier, but rather a precursor to Netanyahu’s recent formal recognition of Somaliland. After a “historic” virtual meeting with Irro, official statements from Tel Aviv and Hargeisa discussed eventual cooperation in technology, development, and trade, citing shared aspirations for a relationship built on “mutual respect and shared values.”
Everything for recognition
For years, Somaliland’s behavior has reflected a willingness to make significant concessions in exchange for formal recognition and the decoupling of its history from Mogadishu. Until Dec. 2025, this was not possible; Hargeisa has instead sought official relations like the UAE’s investment in the Port of Berbera and the appointment of a diplomatic envoy in Somaliland. Even when recognition was limited, and when mediation was needed to settle disputes with Mogadishu, the relationship between the Somaliland government and intermediary powers demonstrate how recognition of the territory’s sovereignty is entwined in broader geopolitical themes.
Khadar Hussein Abdi, Somaliland’s Minister of the Presidency, articulated this pragmatic orientation in recent statements to Al Jazeera. While he denied targeting any Arab or Islamic state, he maintained it was natural for relations to evolve given the strong Israeli presence in his “quasi-state,” which is the largest unrecognized secessionist province in the world.
Faced with the Arab League’s disregard for its repeated pleas for intervention since the Somali Civil War began in 1991, successive secessionist governments have viewed Israel as the key to international recognition—specifically from USA. As the Somaliland government sees it, Israel was among the few states to recognize Somaliland during its five days of independence from Britain in 1960, before it joined the unified Federal Government of Somalia.
The two regions, however, would later become marked by deep contrasts in governance and security, with Somaliland characterized by stability and economic prosperity. Hargeisa uses this narrative to argue that regional governments have neglected it in favor of a fragile, failed state, incapable of gaining unified support.
For decades, official Arab and Islamic presence was limited to religious schools and language missions, including a program at Al-Azhar University hosting students from Somaliland. No major Arab state nor the Arab League offered an effective approach to the issue, consequently providing Israel an opening to intervene.
Zionist strategy latches onto target
Israel’s objectives in Somaliland reflect a broader geopolitical strategy. Chief among them is consolidating their presence in the Bab El-Mandeb Strait, a region of increasing importance for security. The Israeli government also seeks to develop a military and intelligence foothold close to Yemen, Sudan, Ethiopia, and the Nile basin. From such a position, Israel would be better positioned to maneuver against regional rivals while bolstering support for key allies, foremost among them the United States.
While some may believe Egypt’s position is secondary, Cairo is nevertheless harmed directly by Israel’s entry into a region so close to Addis Ababa—a capital with a history of using various pressure tactics against Egypt. Netanyahu is now repeating the exact moves that provoked President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi two years ago, prompting him to sign a high-level military protocol with Somalia and hint at the Arab League’s Joint Defense Pact, stating: “We will not allow any party to threaten Somalia.”
It is worth noting that Egyptian official delegations previously visited Hargeisa to discuss areas of cooperation and to provide assistance in various service and cultural sectors, the most recent visit taking place in May 2019. However, Egypt’s official position has remained consistent in upholding the unity of Somalia’s territory.
Toward tripartite coordination
Israeli support for Somaliland is likely to become a renewed point of attraction for Ethiopia, either to revive the maritime access agreement or, at a minimum, to initiate joint economic and security activities. This could gradually turn the region into another hub for international investment and further consolidate the breakaway territory, strengthening it into a de facto state with viable living conditions and many of the prerequisites for further international recognition.
In October of last year, Addis Ababa hosted Somaliland President Muse Bihi Abdi on an official invitation. The visit reflected the continued progress of bilateral relations, despite the suspension of the maritime access deal.
The likely outcome of this trajectory will not be limited to gaining international legitimacy or shifting the official US position, which still firmly supports a unified Somalia.
Any Israeli-Ethiopian rapprochement in support of Somaliland would pave the way for other significant developments. Importantly, these coordinated efforts could strengthen the Hargeisa government’s ability to suppress internal opposition, including separatist currents within the territory and groups advocating federal unity.
This is especially relevant in light of the sporadic clashes over the past three years in the southern city of Las Anod, which have disrupted the image of stability promoted by successive Somaliland governments.
Such developments would inevitably fuel further secessionist demands, complicating the preservation of Somalia’s territorial unity, while also undermining prospects for lasting calm and contributing to renewed violence.
It thus becomes clear that Israel’s broader strategic objectives and their medium- to long-term outcomes are distinct from Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s own political calculations tied to his relationship with US President Donald Trump.
In recent months, the American leader has suggested that the Republican Party is undergoing shifts that may prompt a reconsideration of the nature of their historic alignment with Israel.
These dynamics are likely to have informed Netanyahu’s formal recognition of Somaliland’s sovereignty as a calculus that reshifts regional balances of power, providing the Zionist state with more geopolitical influence in the Horn of Africa.
Neyanyahu strays from expectations
If Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is the outcome of recent developments in the US and across the Middle East, then the timing of the move points to indications of Israel’s endgame.
Netanyahu acted without coordinating with Donald Trump, even branding the recognition part of the “Abraham Accords” without his prior approval. Shortly thereafter, Trump rejected the Israeli decision and dismissed any likelihood that Washington would follow suit.
Netanyahu nevertheless appears to be pursuing gains that go beyond symbolic endorsement, and beyond the idea of relocating Palestinians from Gaza to Somaliland.
Just two months ago, Asher Lubotsky, a researcher specializing in Israeli-African relations, delivered a lecture at the Institute for National Security Studies at Tel Aviv University on the prospects of recognizing Somaliland. He later published a paper arguing that Israel was unlikely to take such a step unilaterally without US backing.
Lubotsky cited three key concerns: the risk of inciting anger across Arab and Muslim capitals; Israel’s longstanding reluctance to recognize breakaway states, given the precedent it could set for the Palestinian issue in international law; and the belief that recognition should be preceded by symbolic measures, such as opening a trade office or recognizing Somaliland passports. He recommended persuading the Trump administration to take the lead on the move.
However, if we accept that a war criminal who is wanted by the International Criminal Court and in violation of countless UN resolutions protecting Palestinians’ rights is unlikely to hesitate over the potential legal implications for Palestine, then Netanyahu’s maneuver is not a gamble. It is a calculated decision, informed by four key considerations.
First, there is precedent in the United States Congress, where Republican Scott Perry introduced a bill last June calling for recognition of Somaliland as an independent state. This came after months of research papers and policy studies issued by American think tanks, most prominently, the conservative Heritage Foundation’s “Project 2025.” The Foundation argued that by supporting Somalia’s partition, it could strengthen US influence in the Horn of Africa, counter China’s growing presence on the continent, and reverse the erosion of American economic and military leverage there. Netanyahu is well aware that his move helps revive this momentum and taps into ambitions founded in existing research and efforts.
Second, the official Arab response to the suspended Somaliland-Ethiopia agreement has been weak. The matter was contained only after implicit Egyptian warnings and through Turkish intervention—which primarily sought to block other powers from expanding their footprint in the region. Meanwhile, there was no strong reaction from the Gulf states that have been the most active and well-resourced actors there over the past decade, nor did events translate into substantial support for the Federal Government of Somalia.
Third, Israel now sees growing strategic value in broader coordination with Somaliland, Ethiopia, and other regional actors, especially as Egypt and Turkey, separately, deepen their cooperation with Somalia and Djibouti through economic and military partnership agreements. This also provides Israel with alternatives for future maneuvering in the region, even if US recognition is delayed.
Fourth, the move secures a foothold near Yemen in anticipation of any escalation with Iran. This comes amid intense political and military shifts in the south and Saudi airstrikes on positions of the Southern Transitional Council (STC) and its UAE-supplied weaponry after the council rejected Riyadh’s call to withdraw from Hadramout and Al-Mahra. This unfolds against a backdrop of uncertainty surrounding the prospects for Saudi-Emirati coordination, and the possibility of reaching mutual understanding between Tehran and Riyadh over the future of the Houthis.
As usual, Netanyahu seeks to control the terms of the debate. He is targeting the furthest strategic point possible in order to draw Washington and other interested powers into direct engagement with the Somaliland question, capitalizing on a regional landscape teetering on the edge of sweeping transformation and escalation, alongside his current visit to USA.
It is no exaggeration to describe Netanyahu’s move as a form of strategic provocation designed to draw in Trump, and perhaps other influential circles, for negotiations. The Israeli leader is keen to position himself as the sole guardian of US and Israeli interests in the Horn of Africa, and to entrench his status as an irreplaceable strongman of the Middle East. He is adept at leveraging this position and recent developments in Somaliland would enable him to continue to do so.
The reality, however, is clear. To effectively defend the interests of Egypt and other affected regional states, political leaders cannot rely on the UN Security Council. Instead, it is contingent upon readiness to act across multiple fronts in the Horn of Africa and the Gulf of Aden, and on sustained political engagement in Washington to counter Israel’s attempts to expand its regional influence through allies and proxies.