Question of the century: Does Trump's plan jeopardize the Palestinian cause?

Statements by US President Donald Trump align with mediators’ official messages that intensive efforts are needed to launch, without delay, phase-two talks in the plan to end the war in Gaza. Trump’s confident remarks that “ceasefire will hold” undercut any immediate attempt to resume the assault and acts of genocide. That was reflected in Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar’s denial that Israel intends to “renew the war after Hamas releases the detainees.”

Talks on phase two of Trump’s 20‑point plan are set to begin within hours. Most provisions remain vague, even after a draft of the executive program surfaced—prepared by a committee that includes former UK PM Tony Blair and Trump advisers Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff. Many proposals are still disputed by Hamas and other Palestinian factions, as well as by Cairo and likely other Arab capitals, because they would fundamentally reshape the Palestinian cause, the character of the Gaza Strip, and even the Egypt–Israel peace treaty by envisioning Israeli military control of the Philadelphi Corridor and the border crossings.

No actor, however farsighted, can predict what will be implemented or discarded from Trump’s plan across a future clouded for decades by the diabolical destruction of the Gaza Strip. The plan sidelines the Gaza–West Bank relationship, the twin foundations of a Palestinian state, and frames “Palestinian self‑determination and statehood” as awaiting the right “conditions” being in place “for a credible pathway” to that end. Those conditions are contingent on progress in redevelopment and a reform program for the Palestinian Authority being “faithfully carried out.” It also explicitly calls for a “security perimeter” around the Strip “that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat.”

Two Readings of the Plan

Some view the first phase as a step forward despite current warning signs. It retreats from any scenario of forcibly expelling the Palestinians from Gaza and explicitly bans occupying or annexing the Strip. This is seen as a gain after weeks of a concerted Zionist push for annexation that was blunted by regional and international moves.

From this perspective, the Palestinian cause was saved from liquidation by preserving its core elements of people and land. As long as the people endure, resistance endures—even if near‑term steps lead to disarmament, a temporary handover of weapons, or the dismantling of resistance factions’ military infrastructure. This aligns with Trump’s description two days ago of Hamas as “tough, smart, and good negotiators,” adding, “They do not want complete obliteration. Nobody wants it at this point.”

In contrast, others argue the plan puts the cause on a precipice because the agreement is structurally imbalanced.

All strict obligations fall on Hamas and the resistance factions, while Israel receives an open‑ended mandate, without clear timelines or benchmarks, for withdrawal. That leaves 53% of the Strip under the yoke of de facto occupation indefinitely. The plan also fails to define how the occupation’s government and army would relate to the proposed governance structure for Gaza under Trump and Blair, which on paper seems lost in a fantasy of seamless cooperation among all parties.

The security mechanism, under the “Board of Peace,” blends international and regional forces with Palestinian security elements. Its powers are undefined, allowing room for repeated violations by the occupation and even renewed aggression. Egypt’s recent acceptance of this mechanism, after prolonged reservations, suggests continued debate over its composition and role.

This split between optimistic and pessimistic readings raises the central question for the next ten years—and arguably for the Palestinian issue this century: What are the guarantees? Not only for Trump’s plan, but to protect the cause from liquidation and to prevent a renewed genocide.

This broader concept of guarantees goes beyond facilitating phase‑two talks, increasing humanitarian aid, and launching reconstruction, the provision of public utilities, infrastructure work, shelter for returning displaced people, and local governance. It also means building firm deterrents against renewed aggression and blocking any effort to hollow out the plan’s gains so Gaza becomes a defenseless, neutralized territory completely vulnerable to the will of the Israeli occupation—much like today’s West Bank. Only for us to wake up, a few years later, to a landscape of severed territory, shattered livelihoods, and comprehensive control over people’s resources and destiny.

Guarantees for long‑term goals

A shared national vision across Egypt and the Arab and Muslim worlds to prevent Gaza’s slide into that grim fate provides the basis for three goals: ensuring the plan’s early stages succeed, including full withdrawal from the Strip; reconstructing Gaza so it is livable again and then ensuring its economic viability; and protecting the whole Palestinian people’s inalienable rights, above all to self‑determination, an independent state, and the right to resist aggression.

The guarantees needed to achieve those goals cannot simply be drafted, signed, and archived. Any political or military agreement, be it interim or permanent, captures a conflict at a moment in time, whether through parity between parties, a distribution of gains and losses, or outright capitulation. Changing conditions realistically enable the injured party to seek revisions by breaching the deal, pressing to amend its terms, or unilaterally withdrawing—turning the agreement into a historical footnote.

Even agreements grounded in international law and endorsed by UN bodies yield three kinds of guarantees. First are legal guarantees that can be documented and monitored, such as arbitration, international courts, Security Council action, and sanctions. Second are moral guarantees, such as leaders’ high standing and their fidelity to promises that “history will remember,” concern for a reputation of respect for international law, and a belief in good‑neighborliness and cooperation.

In practice, neither of these guarantees fits Trump’s plan. It lacks a legal foundation, speaks in the language of ferocious power, and imposes something close to surrender on the resistance. It adopts Benjamin Netanyahu’s doctrine of a “peace of deterrence.” Israel, for its part, long ago ceased to worry about appearing committed to humanitarian principles and international law.

That leaves a third route—“real‑power guarantees.” These are layered pressures—political, public diplomacy, and economic—aimed at securing broad, sustained international backing for the Palestinian people’s interests. The presence of Trump and other world leaders in Egypt is one example. Next comes steering the negotiations within a clear matrix of obligations on the occupation to prevent any erosion of sovereignty, block any attempt to make Gaza fair game or to sever its border from Egypt, and use this moment to repair intra‑Palestinian ties.

At a later stage, real‑power guarantees must corner Israel through a multifront global mobilization that compels an end to genocide, ongoing aggression, apartheid, and settlement. That means raising the costs of those violations in international courts, sustaining anti‑occupation activism, and strengthening legal action and tools of economic and cultural boycott.

Who holds the real‑power guarantees?

It is reasonable to say the Israeli operation in Doha and the Saudi–Pakistani mutual defense pact helped accelerate US intervention to stabilize its regional interests and to address allies’ alarm over an unchecked Zionist rampage.

But we reached this point—after two catastrophic years—only when Egypt committed its full weight to leading positive mediation. Cairo moved decisively to turn Trump’s plan into negotiations to end the war rather than a document of capitulation, while scaling up humanitarian operations on the ground.

We also arrived here through joint efforts by Arab and Muslim states at two key junctures. The first was international mobilization to recognize the State of Palestine, prompting Trump to shout at Netanyahu, “Israel cannot fight the world, Bibi,” amid growing solidarity among Latin American, African, and European publics. The second was a collective message to Trump that the war must end as quickly as possible.

Those moves came late and were marred by disputes over credit and leadership. The task now is to defuse those tensions—or cut them to a minimum—as a precondition for saving the cause from liquidation. Anyone who assumes the next stages will be less sensitive or procedurally easier is deluding themselves. Real‑power guarantees are the only viable bet, and they will pay off only through unity of effort, continuity, stamina, and a willingness to use every available means to pressure Israel.

The genocidal war has revived rules we nearly forgot during decades of drift. Above all, thwarting Israeli schemes for regional dominance depends on supporting the Palestinian people and their rights until victory is wrested—a victory that will never be granted willingly.