The ‘day after’ is today: What future for Hamas in Gaza’s vacuum?

As the genocidal war against Palestinians in Gaza nears the end of its second year, Hamas has undergone profound organizational, political, and military transformations since launching its attack on Oct 7. These shifts are a result of both the crushing internal pressure on its ability to manage daily life in the Strip, and the collapse of both regional military and political support once provided by Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah.

After demonstrating high levels of combat readiness and operational coordination during the large-scale Al-Aqsa Flood operation, Hamas suffered devastating losses among its top military ranks. Of the Qassam Brigades' military council members, who planned and executed the operation, only Gaza Brigade commander Ezz Al-Din Al-Haddad remains alive. The fates of Raed Saad, head of operations, and Mohamed Shabana, Rafah Brigade commander, remain unknown.

But the changes Hamas is undergoing are not simply reactions to Israel’s devastating bombardment. Shifts in the regional geopolitical landscape, including the fall of the Assad regime in Syria and the assassination of Hezbollah leaders, have redrawn the map of alliances. This has left Hamas facing an existential dilemma: remain steadfast under the rubble with no political horizon, or surrender to conditions tantamount to political suicide.

Tunnels above ground

With much of its weapons-manufacturing and rocket-development infrastructure destroyed, the military approach of Gaza’s resistance factions has shifted radically. They’ve moved towards a war of attrition, in what Palestinian military affairs researcher Rami Abu Zubaydah describes as “a response to battlefield realities and Israel’s scorched-earth policy.”

Abu Zubaydah explained to Al Manassa that the Qassam Brigades’ organizational structure—starting with three-member combat cells and scaling up to brigades of 6,000 to 8,000 fighters—enabled the group to decentralize and transition into a dispersed network of autonomous cells. “Each cell can now independently decide when to engage or set up an ambush, based on its own assessment in the field,” he said.

The choice of decentralized cells was “not a strategic option, but rather an imposed necessity following the destruction of command-and-control centers,” Islam Atallah, a researcher with the National Security Studies Unit at the Palestinian Planning Center, told Al Manassa while acknowledging the flexibility of this structure.

Atallah, who is based in Gaza and has witnessed developments firsthand, believes this structure reduced coordination across fronts and weakened Hamas’ ability to carry out complex, simultaneous operations. “The remaining cells operate under extreme pressure, with supply lines and communications significantly disrupted,” he said.

Despite that, the strategy has proven effective in inflicting painful losses on Israeli forces. From the war’s resumption in March to mid-July, 45 Israeli soldiers were killed across northern and southern Gaza in increasingly frequent operations. The Israeli army suffered no casualties in March, but resistance fighters killed 3 soldiers in April, 8 in May, 21 in June, and 13 by July 15th, 2025.

Former head of the Israeli army’s Operational Directorate Israel Ziv has acknowledged that Hamas studied Israeli military tactics closely and exploited their vulnerabilities. Analysts have pointed to how the rubble of Gaza itself offered Hamas “a tunnel above ground,” creating tactical advantages.

Reserve General Yitzhak Brik echoed this view, casting doubt on official military claims. In Maariv, he wrote that Israel routinely inflates the number of Hamas fighters it claims to have killed after each operation, but those figures don’t stand up to scrutiny. He also argued that the actual presence of Israeli forces in Gaza is much smaller than reported, due to severely low recruitment and a lack of available troops for deployment.

“Attrition isn’t just about the body count or immediate withdrawals. It’s also about eroding the Israeli army’s ability to maintain control, achieve its military goals, stabilize the home front, and convince its own public that the war is worthwhile. And across all those fronts, things are deteriorating,” Abu Zubaydah told Al Manassa.

However, Atallah, whose research focuses on national security and political shifts in the Middle East, believes media coverage has exaggerated the impacts of Hamas' operations. He emphasized that Israeli statements must be viewed through the lens of internal political rivalries. “What doesn’t get reported is that the occupation’s retaliation for each ambush is usually brutal. It doesn’t stop at the site of the attack—it targets anyone suspected of involvement, support, or even proximity to the area,” he said.

According to Atallah, the pursuit isn’t limited to those directly involved in attacks—it extends to elite, highly trained members of the resistance. “These are cadres that are hard to replace, especially amid ongoing war and Israeli efforts to prevent the rebuilding or rearming of the resistance’s military infrastructure. In this light, the battlefield equation hasn’t fundamentally shifted.”

Hamas’ challenges in Gaza extend beyond military losses to include its waning ability to govern and manage daily life for civilians—weaknesses that have led some clans to collaborate with the occupation and challenge Hamas’ authority.

Aziz Al-Masri, a scholar of political history, interprets this cooperation as “a sign of Hamas’ weakening grip, though not yet an existential threat.” The more significant danger, he argues, lies in “the erosion of its internal legitimacy.” This internal crisis has sparked debates within the movement about its future.

Israel’s Gaza vacuum

Hamas’ dilemma mirrors an Israeli one: Israel has failed to destroy Hamas’ military infrastructure and has been unable to create conditions for replacing it as Gaza’s governing power—leaving the question of the “day after” unanswered.

The Critical Threats Project—a US-based initiative launched by the American Enterprise Institute in 2009 to confront perceived threats from Iran and jihadist groups—warned that Israel’s failure to establish a “political end state” for Gaza means the territory will remain without a viable governance structure. This could allow remnants of Hamas to reclaim influence.

Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu has repeatedly declared that neither Hamas nor the Palestinian Authority will be allowed to govern Gaza after the war.

The technocratic committee proposed as a transitional governing body during ceasefire negotiations in Cairo and Doha—brokered by the US, Egypt, and Qatar—is seen as a potential Hamas front, according to Omar Shaban, director of the Palestinian think tank PalThink.

However, sociologist Bahaa Shahira offered Al Manassa a different interpretation. He sees the objective of the Israeli aggression—grounded in the logic of annihilation—as the prevention of any formal Palestinian political or military entity in Gaza. “That’s why multiple voices are calling for direct military rule as a governance model. That’s the most likely scenario in the coming months.”

Some Israeli officials are also exploring other routes. Former prime minister and opposition leader Yair Lapid, for instance, proposed that Egypt temporarily administer the Strip.

Haaretz reported that a senior official described Israel’s so-called “humanitarian city” in southern Gaza as a means to pressure the UAE and Saudi Arabia into administering Gaza, under the banner of liberating it from Israeli control—thus giving those countries a semblance of legitimacy without appearing complicit.

Israeli analyst Nadav Eyal questioned Netanyahu’s “Israel won’t stop until Hamas disarms” slogan, calling it a political smokescreen. “If Hamas agreed to disarm tomorrow, would it happen? Who would enforce it? Only the Israeli army could. No Emirati or Egyptian would comb Deir al-Balah’s alleys to collect every AK-47 rifle,” he said.

“In reality,” he added, “Hamas’ agreement to disarm would likely be a ruse unless Israel fully occupies the territory, rendering any deal with Hamas moot. Why, then, does Israel demand this?”

While Hamas insists on retaining its weapons in ongoing negotiations, Omar Shaban sees a conditional surrender of arms as a possibility. “Some might agree under certain conditions, like a comprehensive national reconciliation. Others suggest placing the weapons under the custody of Arab states. Some, however, refuse to give them up at all. No final decision has been made.”

On the other hand, former Palestinian negotiator and Carnegie Middle East Center expert Yezid Sayigh believes Hamas and other factions are simply trying to survive militarily to avoid being eliminated politically.

Researcher Islam Atallah agrees, adding, “Hamas’ ideological and organizational foundations see weapons not as a mere tool up for negotiation, but as central to its identity and existence. To give them up would be tantamount to dismantling the movement. That could lead to internal divisions and factions refusing to comply.”

He added that Israel’s insistence on disarmament, even when most of Hamas’ remaining arms are light and no longer pose a strategic threat, is a weak pretext to prolong the war. “It gives the impression that Hamas still has the capacity to threaten Israeli security, but that’s not supported by the facts. Light weapons don’t threaten a nuclear-armed state.”

Thus, the persistent uncertainty facing Gaza's population may reflect not Israeli policy failure but deliberate strategy. Shalom Lipner of the Atlantic Council frames Netanyahu's approach as collapsing postwar planning into current operations — what he terms making the 'day after' today. Or, as Sayigh put it, “What makes these ‘forever wars’ is the absence of clear prospects, let alone definite plans, for a politically viable ‘day after,’ especially in Gaza and Lebanon.”