Sudan’s future: peace or partition?

As Sudan’s civil war enters its third year, the military appears to have regained the upper hand, following the recapture of Khartoum from the Rapid Support Forces/RSF. Yet in a startling turn, Port Sudan, long a relative sanctuary from the conflict and now serving as the government’s provisional seat, was jolted awake by explosions, with smoke and fire rising over parts of the city.

This marks the first strike on Port Sudan since the conflict began in 2023. The attacks, reportedly carried out by RSF suicide drones beginning on May 4, shattered the city’s uneasy calm and signaled the paramilitary group retains not only the will but also the capacity to escalate. By targeting the heart of the military’s logistical and political operations, the RSF demonstrated its enduring reach and refusal to concede defeat.

Fragmentation or unity

The war, which broke out on April 25, 2023, stems from the power struggle that arose during Sudan’s post-Bashir transitional period. It has since triggered what the UN has described as the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with more than 150,000 people killed and 12 million displaced.

The machinery of war, fueled by tribal dynamics and entrenched alliances, has fragmented Sudan into a patchwork of zones, some isolated, others overlapping and contested. Recent battlefield developments suggest an emerging geographic bifurcation. The Sudanese Armed Forces/SAF, under General Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and backed by allied armed factions, holds sway over much of the north, east, and central regions. Meanwhile, the southwest remains under the control of the RSF.

This evolving territorial divide has revived anxieties about a potential reconfiguration of the Sudanese state. Unlike the 2011 secession of South Sudan, which split the country along a north-south axis, the present trajectory risks a new rupture—this time between east and west, echoing Libya’s fractured post-2011 landscape.

Bakry Eljack, a public policy professor at Long Island University in New York, told Al Manassa that such division is not hypothetical but already taking shape, with control split between three or four de facto authorities.

In South Kordofan, the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement–North, which has not explicitly aligned with either the army or RSF, has been expanding its influence, Eljack noted. Meanwhile, the SAF controls states such as Khartoum, al-Jazirah, Blue Nile, Sennar, Gedaref, Kassala, and Red Sea, while the RSF maintains its grip elsewhere.

By contrast, Horn of Africa affairs expert Hassan Makki downplayed fears of Sudan’s disintegration, describing the current situation as a temporary domination by various power centers pending a comprehensive peace agreement.

Speaking to Al Manassa, Makki emphasized that whether the RSF is ultimately defeated, retains control over parts of East Darfur—including its stronghold and the state capital, El-Daein—or withdraws entirely, Sudan’s long-term stability will depend on a comprehensive and inclusive peace agreement.

Absent such a settlement, remnants of the conflict including defeated factions, entrenched grievances, and latent sleeper cells, will continue to undermine national cohesion and threaten the fragile authority of the central state.

Makki rejected the characterization of the RSF as a nascent regime. Instead, he described it as a militant formation “whose malevolence and aggression will only cease after a peace agreement that grants them a share of power.”

Drawing a contrast with Libya, he argued that Sudan’s geographic and economic configurations make a permanent east–west split improbable. Unlike Libya’s oil-centered fragmentation, Sudan’s population and resource distribution remain anchored around the Nile, while its principal export routes run through the east.

Moreover, Sudan’s strategic ties with neighboring states—particularly Chad and South Sudan, both of which depend on access to Sudanese ports—would further complicate any durable partition.

Makki predicted that, in the absence of state collapse in SAF-held territories, what remains of Sudan’s formal institutions would likely continue to operate in a reduced capacity. They would maintain control over critical civil functions such as identity documents, passports, and national registries, unless SAF-controlled areas collapse and become conflict zones.

According to military analyst Mu‘izz al-Atabani, Sudan’s fragmentation is not merely a consequence of the current conflict but a long-standing structural risk—one that has historically been contained by powerful tribal coalitions in the north, east, and central regions, as well as parts of the west. What distinguishes the present moment, he warned, is the potential for lasting demographic upheaval driven by the widespread resettlement of foreign and domestic combatants.

“The RSF has enlisted fighters from virtually every western tribe and reinforced its ranks with mercenaries from Arab communities across central and West Africa,” Al-Atabani told Al Manassa. “This has drastically altered the country’s demographic composition.”

For Al-Atabani, this shift represents not only a military tactic but also a strategic gamble. One that could sow enduring instability by redrawing Sudan’s social and ethnic map, particularly in regions already strained by displacement and resource scarcity.

UAE and Iran: regional fingerprints

Regional actors have not stood idly by. Since the war’s outbreak, there have been repeated calls for peace talks, leading to three main negotiation rounds in Jeddah under the auspices of Saudi Arabia and the United States. However, they failed to achieve a lasting ceasefire. Further efforts in Manama and Geneva with a focus on humanitarian access also failed, with the army boycotting them on grounds of bias. The African Union’s IGAD initiative has similarly stalled.

On April 10, the US and Saudi Arabia renewed calls for negotiations, urging the opening of humanitarian corridors and protection for civilians. But mutual demonization, deep mistrust, and the absence of a decisive military outcome have derailed all attempts to end the war.

Meanwhile, both parties have accused regional powers of fueling and prolonging the conflict with weapons and cash. The Sudanese army and government accuse the UAE of providing military and financial support to the RSF. In turn, the RSF alleges that Egypt and Iran are backing the army.

In early May, Sudan’s government filed a case against the UAE at the International Court of Justice. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, prompting Khartoum to sever diplomatic ties and designate the UAE as a hostile state.

Before that ruling, RSF leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, known as Hemedti, attempted a strategic pivot by calling for the formation of a parallel government. In mid-April, he proposed a broad civilian alliance that would “represent the true face of Sudan,” citing talks in Nairobi between the RSF and allied armed groups. The Government of Peace and Unity initiative included a list of 15 candidates for a proposed presidential council representing all of Sudan’s regions—described as a “symbol of voluntary unity.”

A weakened and fractured Sudan

Hemedti’s proposal failed to garner regional backing, even from usual RSF allies such as the UAE, possibly due to fears that Sudan’s partition would ultimately serve no one’s interests.

Still, Bakry Eljack argues that keeping Sudan weak and dysfunctional benefits certain foreign powers by making it easier to exploit its vast water resources and livestock wealth.

Makki, however, believes the RSF will face increasing isolation, noting that African states that once welcomed Hemedti are unlikely to shield him under international pressure, especially if the Sudanese state reasserts itself.

While the war has now passed its third year, Makki concludes that the path to recovery and healing will likely require far more time.