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The final moments of a funeral mass for Pope Francis are held in Vatican City, Saturday, April 26, 2025.

As others flew to Rome, Pope Tawadros chose a different path

Published Monday, May 5, 2025 - 13:26

As presidential and religious delegations departed airports around the world en route to Rome for the funeral of the Pope of the Vatican, Pope Tawadros II of Alexandria, head of the Coptic Orthodox Church, packed his bags too—but bound for a different destination on the same continent.

Pope Tawadros led a pastoral delegation to Poland, where photos circulated showing him seated among passengers in economy class. The modest travel arrangements stood in stark contrast to the protocol-laden entourages headed to the Vatican.

The timing of the trip—launched last Friday towards Warsaw—initially implied a brief stopover, with a subsequent appearance at the Vatican. However, the Coptic delegation defied expectations by commencing its program in Poland rather than heading directly to the Apostolic Palace for the funeral rites.

Egypt’s presidential delegation attended the funeral, represented by Osama Al-Azhari, the Minister of Religious Endowments, alongside the secretary-general of the Muslim Council of Elders, chaired by the Grand Imam of Al-Azhar.

In contrast, the Coptic Orthodox Church dispatched a team of bishops whose ecclesiastical rank and political standing appeared insufficient to mirror the evolving, and at times intimate, ties between the two ancient Christian churches of Alexandria and Rome.

Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II sits with members of the church on a flight to Poland, Friday, April 25, 2025.

In the days leading up to the visit, Bishop Raphael of Central Cairo posted on Facebook, "Condolences to our Catholic brothers on the passing of the Pope of the Vatican." The statement, later deleted, sparked controversy. It conspicuously omitted the standard Coptic prayer for the dead and avoided the ecclesiastical term "repose," typically reserved for the death of clergy.

To critics, Bishop Raphael’s choice of language exposed underlying sectarian sentiments within the Coptic Church. Long affiliated with the conservative bloc of the Holy Synod, he has consistently resisted theological rapprochement with the Catholic Church. His statement read less like a diplomatic oversight and more like an intentional withholding of posthumous honor from those outside his ecclesiastical framework.

This stance is part of a broader pattern. Raphael previously declined to recognize the slain Abbot Epiphanius of the Monastery of Saint Macarius as a martyr, arguing that being killed was not in itself sufficient grounds for sanctification. Consistent with this view, he refrained from using the word "repose" for the Pope of the Vatican, as though invoking divine mercy would compromise doctrinal integrity.

Yet the Holy Synod does not fall neatly into camps of traditionalists versus reformists. Bishops frequently shift their stances depending on the issue at hand. Nevertheless, a steadfast conservative faction has regularly opposed Pope Tawadros and his circle, particularly on matters of ecumenism, gender roles, and contemporary theological debates. Key figures in this group include Bishop Raphael, Bishop Agathon of Maghagha and Adwa, and Metropolitan Benjamin of Monufia.

In contrast, those seen as part of the post-Shenouda generation—bishops ordained or elevated under Tawadros—such as Bishop Daniel of Maadi, the Synod’s secretary, and Bishop Yulius, who oversees social services, tend to align more closely with the current papacy’s pragmatic approach.

Between two churches

Historically, the Roman Church has not dispatched popes to the funerals of Coptic patriarchs. When Pope Cyril VI died in 1971, Rome sent a delegation, not a pontiff. Similarly, Pope Shenouda III did not attend the funerals of any of the three popes who passed away during his tenure. If Pope Tawadros’ decision was guided by a pattern of mutual absence, the Church offered no public explanation for it.

Some observers argue the absence reflects deeper tensions. In 2017, Tawadros signed an agreement recognizing mutual baptism between the Coptic and Catholic churches—only to soften the language after intense conservative backlash. The declaration shifted to a more cautious "seeking acceptance of baptism," signaling a retreat from theological engagement.

This caution sits awkwardly alongside Pope Francis’ inclusive ecumenical efforts. During Tawadros’ first visit to the Vatican in 2013, the two leaders inaugurated a "Day of Love," a milestone in the churches’ relationship. Francis’ tenure has emphasized openness towards other Christian traditions, while Tawadros’ posture has grown increasingly ambivalent.

The legacy of Pope Shenouda

In this context, Pope Shenouda’s church appeared markedly clearer in its pursuit of Christian unity and its movement towards a global church identity. In contrast, the post-Shenouda church seems to move only to step back, increasingly resembling a body adrift without a clear compass, vulnerable to the shifting winds. Today, its defining characteristic appears to be a flexibility shaped more by pressure than by openness to change—a flexibility that signals not adaptation, but the absence of a theological or political direction.

Pope Shenouda III, the predecessor of Pope Tawadros, was known for his clarity of vision. He sought unity with other churches not by compromising doctrine, but by crafting parallel narratives: a rigid, Orthodox discourse for internal consumption, and a diplomatic, dialogical tone for the global stage. 

Under the late Shenouda III, the Coptic Church voiced a clear theological and political opposition to Christian Zionism,a position deeply grounded in its Egyptian identity and shaped by its awareness of the fragile regional dynamics with Israel and its neighbors. However, the post-Shenouda era has witnessed a noticeable shift. While expressions of condemnation regarding the Isreali war on Gaza have been voiced, they often lack the profound theological grounding that characterized the previous era.

Under the late Pope Shenouda III, the Coptic Church articulated a firm theological and political opposition to Christian Zionism—a position deeply grounded in its Egyptian identity and shaped by its awareness of the fragile regional dynamics with Israel and its neighbors.

Pope Shenouda’s church focused on reinforcing the Christian family as the cornerstone of Coptic identity, particularly amid a rising tide of Islamic influence. Shenouda and his allies saw the family unit as vital for preserving the Coptic presence.

After his passing, the church largely withdrew from addressing pressing issues like women’s rights and gender roles, which have become increasingly urgent in modern life. Theological engagement on these matters remains limited, emerging only through isolated efforts to bridge Coptic tradition and contemporary ideas of equality.

The contrast may also stem from fundamental differences in the characters of Shenouda and Tawadros. Shenouda belonged to the generation shaped by Egypt’s Sunday School movement during the liberal era, a time marked by political and intellectual transformation. These formative years endowed him with a keen ability to navigate political currents and craft nuanced ecclesiastical discourse.

By contrast, Tawadros came of age during a period when Copts were retreating from the public sphere into the confines of the church. This shift heavily influenced his clerical identity, which leans towards seclusion from public affairs—engaging with them only when compelled by his position on the throne of Saint Mark. Over time, political and societal forces have cast him in the dual role of spiritual and political representative of the Coptic community, a position shaped more by circumstance than design.

A dual narrative

Coptic Orthodox Pope Tawadros II, right, meets with Pope Francis at the Vatican on Wednesday, May 10, 2023, marking the 50th anniversary of the signing of an agreement of understanding between their two churches.

Pope Shenouda’s church demonstrated a sharper understanding of the political and ecclesiastical pressures it faced. Shenouda and his team of bishops crafted two distinct narratives. The first was for local consumption, underscoring an unwavering Coptic Orthodox identity in a landscape increasingly contested by other Christian denominations, especially Protestantism.

This narrative was not new. It dated back to the nineteenth century when Christian missionary schools sought to convert Egyptian Orthodox Christians to Catholicism or Protestantism, prompting the foundation of Sunday Schools by Saint Habib Girgis (1876–1951), author of "The Rock of Orthodoxy". This movement emphasized building a Coptic national consciousness rooted in early church doctrine and shielded against Protestant reforms. 

In parallel, Shenouda’s church developed a second narrative for international engagement, repositioning the Church of St. Mark as an Eastern Orthodox voice within the global ecumenical landscape. This approach was evident in the church’s contributions to the World Council of Churches, where it advocated for dialogue without compromising core doctrines. Bishop Samuel, a leading figure in the church’s social services, played a pivotal role in this global vision during the 1970s, before his assassination alongside President Sadat.

Among the key stances was the church’s firm opposition to Christian Zionism and its robust participation in theological dialogues with other denominations, including the Catholic Church.

Today, the post-Shenouda church—a term used because Shenouda’s era still casts a long shadow—has largely abandoned this governing logic. It faces immense challenges, primarily globalization and technology, which have rendered it impossible to maintain separate narratives for internal and external audiences. Messages intended for external dialogue are now instantly broadcast internally, and vice versa.

As a result, the church struggles to craft a unified discourse that resonates across different audiences and affirms its identity beyond the narrow frame of its entanglement with the Egyptian state.

In this fragmented moment, Pope Tawadros’ leadership appears increasingly reactive to pressures from conservative factions. These factions, critical of Tawadros’ overtures to Catholics, compelled him to retract the original mutual baptism agreement and reframe it after its publication. 

The political meaning of absence

Coptic Orthodox Pope Shenouda III celebrates a mass in an undated photo.

Pope Tawadros’ decision to skip the Vatican funeral revives memories of a different, controversial choice made a decade earlier. In 2015, Tawadros boarded a flight to Israel to preside over the funeral of Bishop Abraham, the late Metropolitan of Jerusalem. In doing so, he directly contravened the Holy Synod’s 1980 decision prohibiting Copts from visiting occupied Jerusalem in political solidarity with Palestinians.

At the time, Tawadros justified his move as a purely ecclesiastical duty, insisting the trip had no political implications. Yet the aftermath suggested otherwise. His visit helped erode longstanding resistance within the Coptic community against travel to Jerusalem, with increasing numbers of pilgrimages following in the years after. The rhetoric shifted too, as church figures began openly encouraging visits while distancing themselves from Pope Shenouda’s earlier "hardline position".

Against that backdrop, Tawadros’ absence from Francis’ funeral raises uncomfortable questions. If he deemed it appropriate to defy a decades-old ban to honor a friend in Jerusalem, why was a similar gesture withheld from the head of the Roman Catholic Church, with whom he shared a notable ecumenical bond?

The situation also invites scrutiny into the internal workings of today's Coptic Church. Who advises the pope? Who crafts the church’s external messaging? And who determines how it balances theology, diplomacy, and public perception?

Such questions are not merely academic. They will shape the future of relations between the Coptic Orthodox Church and the Vatican once the white smoke rises again over Rome, heralding a new papacy.

For now, what remains visible is not merely caution, but hesitation — a symptom of an institution caught between a legacy it has not fully transcended and a future it has yet to articulate.


(*)A version of this article first appeared in Arabic on April 28, 2025