Cotton Specters| Orphans of the soil and the battle over value
The cotton goes after all to Mizrahi and Qardahi,⁽¹⁾
and the son of the soil sits drained, an orphan in his own place.
The cotton he sowed with his own hands,
and gathered with his own hands,
when sold, will not even leave him
the price of fodder.
Classical theory holds that an economy rests on a balance between supply and demand. The vast accumulation of capital built on the old cotton system worked the other way. It encouraged a growing supply of raw cotton, to drive its price down, and at the same time held back the supply of finished goods, to push their prices up and swell manufacturers’ profits.
The environmental historian Jason W. Moore offers a way to see why the history of capitalism so often departs from the textbook picture: his concept of “Cheap Nature.” Moore explains that capitalism accumulates on this scale by encouraging a growing supply of labor, food, energy, and raw materials, what he terms the “Four Cheaps,” in order to lower the cost of production.
The paradox Moore points to is that capitalism piles up profit by inverting what we would expect. Producers of raw materials should have been the richest, since what they produce is scarce by nature, and Europe’s machine owners the poorest, since their output can be multiplied without limit.
Moore turns to cotton, and to Karl Marx, to make the case. He points to Marx’s observation that capitalist production, left to itself, makes the share of constant capital (machinery) race far ahead of the share of raw materials, so that demand for those materials grows faster than their supply. Large-scale industry therefore depends on Cheap Nature. It was the steep fall in the price of cotton, as output expanded around the world, that allowed the cotton industry to develop as it did.
As earlier parts in the ‘Cotton Specters’ series showed, Britain tried to expand the land allocated for cotton in India, Sudan and Egypt. It also tried to raise the yield of land already planted, engineering a modern agricultural policy that did away with crop rotation and leaned harder on improved seeds, fertilizers and chemical pesticides. The result was a string of environmental, economic and social problems.
Beyond expanding the planted area and raising yields, this article draws on previously unpublished archival documents to look at some of the regulatory measures Britain used to push cotton prices down between the wars, adding another layer to the difficulties facing cotton growing in Egypt.
A compulsory price ceiling
By the summer of 1917, Egypt’s cotton crisis, under the weight of the First World War, had reached its peak. It exposed a contradiction in British policy. Classical economics held up free prices as the best way to allocate resources, since they signal where the economy is short and where it is plentiful; the occupation authorities, meanwhile, wanted the input costs of their most important industry, textiles, kept out of the market’s reach.
The war disrupted shipping, and huge quantities of raw cotton piled up in Alexandria’s warehouses, unable to leave. For Egyptian growers this was good news: scarcity sent prices on the Alexandria exchange’s futures market to record highs. For Britain it was bad news, since it raised the cost of raw materials for its industries.
A confidential diplomatic report from the office of the British High Commissioner in Alexandria to the Foreign Office speaks plainly of the clash of interests between Egypt and Britain over cotton prices, commenting on the price disturbances of 1917.⁽²⁾
“The interests of Egypt as producer are in fact opposed to those of United Kingdom as purchaser and it is feared that measures taken in the interest of the Liverpool market might have an opposite effect here. In particular any measure tending to restriction of price would cause the utmost emotion through-out the country and could not be supported by the Govt. Ministers have also to reckon with public opinion which is unduly sensitive to the vicissitudes of the futures market. The public favours any kind of speculation as a bull factor. The press has been full of immoderate criticism of action taken in closing the Bourse.”
The report adds that the British decision to restrict futures trading on the exchange, in the name of curbing speculation, met with political and popular rejection inside Egypt. Egyptian ministers opposed closing the exchange or setting a price ceiling, and officials warned that capping prices at home while world markets, American ones included, stayed free and high would breed political tension, besides throwing forward supply contracts into disarray.
With political remedies exhausted, the British High Commissioner in Cairo proposed another: using “the British military authorities” to close the exchange and enforce the restrictions under martial law. The report is explicit: “In view of [the decision’s] unpopularity. I should like to know whether urgency is such that if necessary Bourse should be closed by British Military authorities which would naturally transfer the odium from [Egyptian] Ministers to H.M.G.”
The announcement made to the House of Commons on June 25, 1918, confirmed the direction:
“As from 1st August next the entire crop available for export will be acquired by the Cotton Control Commission established under a scheme jointly arranged between His Majesty’s Government and the Government of Egypt, and will be sold at fixed prices by the Commission within the limits prescribed by the Board of Trade.”
The compulsory purchase went hand in hand with the suspension of the National Bank of Egypt’s conversion of its banknotes into gold. Paper currency was made compulsory tender and used to buy cotton, to cover the costs of British forces in Egypt, and to tie Egypt’s finances to Britain’s: British bonds and Treasury bills were issued as backing for the Egyptian pound in place of the Egyptian gold deposited in London. The policy drove inflation rates in most foodstuffs to 200–300% by 1918, compared with prewar levels.
While the prices of basic goods nearly tripled, wages rose only slightly, out of all proportion to the increase in prices.
Historians Rauf Abbas and Assem El-Dessouky show, in “The Large Landowning Class and the Peasantry in Egypt, 1837–1952,” that in 1918 the British government bought Egyptian cotton at 42 tallaris (the trade’s dollar) per qintar (around 50 kg) for extra-long-staple Sakellaridis graded “very good.”
This was far below the prices cotton fetched in free transactions, which topped 60 tallaris. The farmer was made to sell his crop below what it cost to grow, a cost runaway inflation had driven sharply up, and to buy everything he needed at three times the old price.
This forced intervention of 1918 united Egyptian society, across its classes, against the British occupation. Large and small landowners felt wronged, and squeezed by the compulsory price set by the Control Commission, while small fellahin (peasants) and workers bore the rising cost of living with no matching rise in their wages or in the price of their crop. That economic bitterness became the foundation of the cross-class alliance on which the 1919 Revolution was built.
When Britain believes in markets
A study by Panza and Karakoç in the Economic History Review finds that output and productivity began to rise in the 1920s, as growers switched to new varieties, chiefly Ashmouni and Sakellaridis, at the expense of Mit Afifi, which had run into serious environmental trouble. In 1906, Mit Afifi accounted for about 75% of the cotton crop and Ashmouni about 20%. By the early 1920s, a decade after its appearance, Sakellaridis made up around 75%, while Mit Afifi had almost vanished. By the 1940s, Ashmouni and Giza 7 dominated and Sakellaridis, too, had receded.
According to Panza and Karakoç, the development of new seeds was one of the main reasons production recovered between the wars. Yet as output recovered, prices fell steadily (see Fig. 1 below).
British authorities and foreign traders developed an elaborate set of regulatory and commercial instruments to press down on Egyptian cotton prices, chief among them so-called “on-call” contracts and “right of rejection” clauses. The Egyptian government tried at the time to ban them. On-call contracts, it found, could be used to manipulate prices and deliberately push them down, with ruinous financial consequences for Egyptian producers and farmers.
A confidential technical report on buying cotton in the villages, issued by the High Commissioner’s office in 1923, shows that Buying On-Call, as the report terms it, had been in use since 1906 to meet foreign spinners’ demand to buy the crop months before it was picked. According to those records, the merchant bought cotton from farmers without fixing a final price. He gave them a cash advance and left the purchase price hanging, tied to futures prices on the Alexandria exchange. The peasants themselves, the documents show, were pushed to hold out until the last moment, hoping for a rise. But since custom fixed prices on the exchange’s last trading day, which fell on the 23rd of the month, the rush of sales that day sent prices tumbling.
On the sharp drops that defied sellers’ hopes, the report⁽³⁾ says:
“This dilatory method of fixing was the cause of big fortunes being lost in 1920, when cotton was at $0.65 in November and finished up at $0.25 in March, and in the following year $0.45 in November , $0.35 in March. All the fixings were left until the last moment, with the result that the cultivators became indebted 1) to the buyer who had over-advanced the value of the cotton when it was delivered 2) to his landlord for rent, or the Mortgage Bank for instalments 3) to all his small creditors, who are usually paid off by the proceeds of the sale of his cotton.”
Abusing the right to refuse
The right of rejection (or refusal of defective goods) began as a traditional condition guaranteeing the quality of the crop, but traders turned it into a way of pressing prices down. Say a merchant has committed under a forward contract to buy a consignment of cotton at a set price, and the price collapses before delivery. He now faces a loss. To wriggle out, he inspects the consignment and pleads that its quality falls short of the agreed sample. The mere threat of invoking the right lets him force the price down sharply, until the owner, stuck with an enormous quantity of physical cotton, accepts the reduced price.
The blow fell first on the large producer, or the middleman who gathered cotton from small farmers. When the big consignment reached Alexandria, the foreign buyer announced he was “rejecting the consignment” for poor quality, and so escaped the high price.
Shipping such quantities back from Alexandria to the provinces was hard and costly, so the owner or local merchant, most of them resident Greeks, had no choice but to accept the lower price. The effect naturally reached the countryside, since the merchant who collected the cotton passed his prospective loss on to small farmers.
British archival documents indicate that the Egyptian government’s insistence on abolishing the clause came after a European merchant invoked the right to reject a huge consignment of cotton belonging to King Fuad I himself. A letter dated Nov. 13, 1923, from the Financial Adviser to the Ministry of Finance to the British High Commissioner passes over the deeper dimensions of the matter and turns a market reform into a personal grudge, asserting he has “reason to believe that the King has been behind it to a considerable extent owing to some unfortunate personal experiences on this Bourse.”
The archival records also show British officials and trade representatives campaigning to disable these reforms.
A letter from the president of the British Chamber of Commerce in Alexandria, dated Nov. 3, 1923, and addressed to the British Commercial Attaché in Cairo, objected to any government interference with established trading methods. The Chamber defended the on-call system as essential to exporters and to foreign textile mills. The letter states:
“Whilst the Chamber has no wish to put forward views about transactions ‘on call’ between sellers and buyers in Egypt, it considers that any attempt to prevent cotton exporters in this country selling ‘on call’ to spinners abroad, is an interference with legitimate trading, and would seriously prejudice traders’ interests.”
A confidential internal minute from the British Residency in Cairo, dated Nov. 8, 1923, records deliberations on the cotton exchange and market regulation bill the Egyptian government had proposed. In it, a Mr. Mizrahi—described as the manager of Lloyds in Egypt—privately concedes that big foreign merchants were manipulating the market, abusing the right of refusal to force prices down at the close and rejecting consignments with no commercial justification. He called these “scandalous practices.” Then he hurried to strip the proposed Egyptian legislation of its social legitimacy. The law, Mizrahi claimed, had been designed for rich landowners and pashas holding more than a thousand feddans. The small peasant, he alleged, sells his crop for cash in the village and is untouched by the regulation, and he saw no reason to protect wealthy owners. He passed over the effect of the practice on the price of every grade of cotton.
Edward Crowe, representing the mortgage and credit companies, defended on-call sales as well, dismissing any attempt to ban them as “absurd.” He went on to plead victimhood on behalf of creditors and foreign trading houses, who carry greater risks than the banks, complaining that “the laws in Egypt always protect the Fellah” and adding, wistfully, that his firm, which lends money at a reasonable rate of interest, was rarely allowed to foreclose, even when a debtor deliberately refused to pay a single millieme for years and cheated his lenders.⁽⁴⁾
This British resistance to regulating the Egyptian market revealed a contradiction within British policy itself. Five years earlier, high cotton prices had threatened the British army’s purchases and the profit margins of the Lancashire spinning mills. It was then that British authorities abandoned the principles of “free” contracting, nationalized the whole trade, suspended future contracts, and fixed prices.
Edging toward communism
The British drive to lower the price of cotton led the imperial authorities, in 1921, to consider cooperating with the fledgling Soviet Union. At a time when the capitalist world feared the export of socialist revolution, London showed itself open to a Soviet request to visit Egypt and draw on its farming expertise to expand cotton production in Soviet Turkestan and the Caucasus. The motive was British: a larger supply of cotton would press its price down, to the benefit of British spinning mills.
The outlines of the attempt emerge from a letter that the Soviet diplomat Nikolai Klyshko sent, on the instructions of Leonid Krasin, head of the Soviet trade delegation, to the prominent British diplomat Esmond Ovey on June 26, 1921. The Soviets wanted to promote home-grown cotton by sending a mission of three specialists to Egypt to study cultivation methods on the ground, and cited the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement. The letter reads:
“No doubt you are aware that Russia has started the growing of cotton in Turkestan and the Caucasus, using for this purpose Egyptian seeds. During the last seven years the culture of cotton has been retarded, and we are therefore experiencing some difficulty at present. It is with the object of studying the question of cotton-growing on the spot that the Soviet Government wishes to send these three specialists to Egypt.”⁽⁵⁾
The British opening soon collided with a political wariness of Bolshevism and the danger of its spreading across the Middle East. Official suspicion shows in a letter Ovey wrote to the High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, on July 7, 1921. Besides pointing out that the trade agreement gave the Soviets no automatic right of entry to Egypt, he warned of suspicious activities beyond the stated purpose of the visit:
“His Majesty’s Government would however, point out to the Egyptian Government that their experience of Soviet delegations does not lead them to believe that these experts will confine their activities to the study of cotton growing, and in these circumstances perhaps the Egyptian Government would be well advised to withhold permission for the visit.”
On that recommendation the correspondence ended in refusal, out of fear that the agricultural experts would turn into secret agents spreading Bolshevik propaganda in Egypt, at a time when socialist organizations there were active. The technical grounds came down to the visit’s lack of practical use. Soviet growing regions relied on fast-maturing varieties of Asiatic and American stock, while Egyptian conditions, with long-staple cotton, demanded long growing seasons.
British misgivings were reinforced by the record of Nikolai Klyshko, who had drafted the request and whom British services had classed among the most dangerous “cadres of Communist subversion and propaganda.” Foreign Office documents and British security records say of Klyshko that he:
“Before the 1917 Revolution, Klishko lived in England as a political exile, married an Englishwoman and was in touch with many of the most 'advanced' thinkers in the Socialist movement. In 1918 he was deported with Litvinov to his native land, only to return in 1920 with Krassin, as secretary to the Russian Trade Delegation and as a person enjoying diplomatic immunity.
"In 1923 the true reason of his presence in Great Britain had been established—it was ascertained that he was in charge of the organisation for subversive propaganda, and Lord Curzon informed the Bolsheviks that his presence was no longer desired. Klishko was then withdrawn.
"He was employed for a time in the Moscow Foreign Office, and then was sent as the instrument of the Communist International to China, working there with Nicolas Borodin in 1924 and 1925 as one of the chief revolutionary agents. Finally, his activities again having become apparent, he was deported on the request of the British authorities. Within the last two weeks he returned to England.”
The colonial management of the cotton economy went beyond holding down the value of Egyptian cotton through compulsory pricing and exchange manipulation to include a wider network of tools for extracting value: financial intermediaries and commercial banks, mortgage terms and debt, and finally the seizure of land.
The banking mechanisms of value extraction will be the subject of the next article in this series. They worked as a central tool for appropriating the surplus produced by the land and by human labor. They kept the cotton economy from becoming a possible source of national capital accumulation, and fixed its role as a means of feeding accumulation in industry and finance in the core.
⁽¹⁾Mizrahi and Qardahi are stand-ins for foreign merchant surnames; the poem sets them against the ibn al-balad, the ordinary Egyptian. Berseem is Egyptian clover, the standard fodder crop.
⁽²⁾TNA FO 141/636/6, Cairo Agency, “Alexandria Cotton Market,” tel. no. 705, July 4, 1917, doc. 219/8.
⁽³⁾TNA FO 141/450/9, British Residency, Cairo, memorandum from Mr. Carver to Mr. Scott, “Buying Over Contracts in Villages,” High Commissioner’s stamp dated November 1, 1923, file no. 291/17.
⁽⁴⁾TNA FO 141/636/6, Cairo Agency, “Alexandria Cotton Market,” confidential file no. 219.
⁽⁵⁾TNA FO 141/450/9, Cairo, 1921, file no. 13534, “Wish of the Soviet Government to Send Cotton-Growing Experts to Egypt.”