Reading the runes: Cairo’s cautious eye on the New Damascus

The reception of Syrian Foreign Minister Assad Al-Shaibani in the New Administrative Capital in early May was no mere diplomatic formality. It represented a pivotal moment of testing for a relationship that has emerged from a period of estrangement without yet entering a phase of reconciliation.

This is a relationship navigating a “gray zone,” shrouded in deep-seated caution yet driven by a pragmatic pursuit of the economic opportunities offered by the “New Syria.”

As the first official visit by a high-ranking Syrian official since the collapse of the Assad regime in December 2024, the meeting was less an announcement of a breakthrough and more an attempt to measure the boundaries of the possible.

The two nations are bound by a burdensome historical memory, intricate regional entanglements, and complex security anxieties—all unfolding against a backdrop of a US-Iranian conflict redefining regional balances, Israeli expansionism on Syrian soil, and a race for influence involving Turkey, the Gulf States, and the West.

While Syrian President Ahmed Al-Sharaa visited Cairo last year, he did so as a participant in the Arab League Summit, not as an official guest of the Egyptian state. Similarly, although Al-Shaibani has met his Egyptian counterpart on several occasions abroad, and cameras captured brief exchanges between El-Sisi and Al-Sharaa during the EU-Regional Partners meeting in Cyprus last month—where protocol seated them side-by-side—these gestures were not the catalyst for the current shift.

Uncomfortable facts on the ground

Ignoring the “New Syria” is no longer a viable strategic option for Cairo. According to four diplomatic sources who spoke to Al Manassa, there is no direct link between the presidential encounter in Nicosia and Al-Shaibani’s recent visit; the arrangements for the latter had been in motion for some time.

“There have been ongoing communications between the Egyptian and Syrian ministers. The Syrians have long been interested in visiting Cairo, and deliberations eventually led to a consensus on this timing to explore potential avenues for consultation,” a diplomatic source privy to the Egyptian–Syrian talks told Al Manassa on condition of anonymity.

The official Egyptian statement that came after the meeting emphasized “concerted efforts to combat terrorism” and the management of “foreign fighters,” while affirming “full respect for Syria’s sovereignty” and its state institutions. Abdelatty further invoked the “depth of historical ties” and a “shared legacy” between the two brotherly peoples.

Despite the standard diplomatic veneer, it is evident that Cairo does not view New Syria as a partner with “complete legitimacy,” but rather as a political reality that must be stress-tested. This sentiment was echoed by the Egyptian Foreign Minister in January of last year when he characterized the Syrian leadership as a “de facto authority.”

Egypt’s reservations toward the Al-Sharaa administration stem from Cairo’s perception of the Arab Spring as an existential threat. While post-25 Jan. 2011 Egypt—under the transitional Military Council and later Mohamed Morsi—aligned with the Syrian Revolution and severed ties with Assad’s Damascus, President El-Sisi explicitly declared his support for Assad’s survival in 2016 in the name of “stability.” In the Egyptian security mind, regardless of his crimes, Bashar Al-Assad represented the model of a state resisting chaos and armed militancy.

Unions & differences

The current tension belies a deeply rooted historical bond. The two nations united for three years as the “United Arab Republic” (1958–1961) and fought side-by-side in the October 1973 War, unified by the Israeli threat. Relations only soured in 1978 when Syria, along with other Arab states, boycotted Egypt following Anwar Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem and his pursuit of a peace treaty with Israel.

However, the relationship solidified as Egypt gradually returned to the Arab fold in the late 1980s. The 1990s through 2005 witnessed remarkable cooperation, culminating in Egyptian mediation between Syria and Turkey in 1998. In 2000, Mubarak received Bashar Al-Assad with great fanfare upon his succession of his father. This pattern held until the assassination of Rafic Hariri in 2005 and further deteriorated following the 2006 Israeli war on Lebanon.

A partnership of necessity

The source familiar with the talks believes that “given Syria’s opening toward multiple actors—from Turkey and the Gulf to the United States—it was essential to establish direct contact and broader channels for dialogue.”

A senior Egyptian diplomat echoed this sentiment. “From a political standpoint, Syria is a pivotal state. There is no utility in being the sole holdout against the ruling authority.” He noted that most international players are already engaged in arrangements with Damascus. “The Russians received Al-Sharaa in a bilateral framework before us. Remaining isolated in a position of opposition is ultimately a futile endeavor.”

According to the same source, FM Badr Abdelatty has been working toward this realignment for some time, successfully navigating a landscape filled with reservations regarding the “ideological and jihadist roots” of the new Damascus elite.

A third diplomatic source, who has managed the Syria file for years, suggests that Abdelatty was never convinced of the utility of a closed door. Instead, he adopted a “Realpolitik” approach. “It is pure realism,” the source told Al Manassa. “These individuals are reprehensible, but they are persistent. We must attempt to influence them rather than boycott them.”

In Cairo, this realism is framed as a “step-by-step” repositioning. Consequently, investment emerged as the safest language during the Cairo meeting. While heavy political files—such as the future of full diplomatic representation and security concerns—were handled with extreme caution by the Egyptian side, economic cooperation appeared far less sensitive.

The Turkish formula

Economics was the center of gravity during the expanded session, which included Egyptian Minister of Industry Khaled Hashem and Syrian Minister of Economy and Trade Mohammad Nidal Al-Shaar. The meeting concluded with a push to establish an Egyptian–Syrian Business Council.

Damascus moved swiftly. Hours after Al-Shaibani left Cairo, the Syrian side of the council was formed, signaling an attempt to institutionalize economic cooperation away from political fluctuations—a trajectory mirroring the normalization process between Egypt and Turkey.

This comparison is not merely rhetorical. Egyptian–Turkish normalization required years of indirect contact and economic initiatives before culminating in Erdogan’s visit to Cairo in February 2024. The same logic applies here: start where there is no dispute and let the politics mature “on a low flame.”

This strategy translated into a visit by an Egyptian trade and business delegation to Damascus early this year—the first in 15 years. President Al-Sharaa welcomed the delegation, stating that “the Egyptian-Syrian relationship is not a luxury, but a duty.”

Under Al-Sharaa, Syria witnessed a massive influx of investment, estimated at $28 billion in the first six months of his presidency alone, driven by legislative reforms and the lifting of international sanctions like the Caesar Act. Gulf investments played a central role in reconstructing vital infrastructure.

Al-Sharaa is leveraging these channels to consolidate his legitimacy. At the time of the Syrian minister’s visit to Cairo, Al-Sharaa was receiving Egyptian businessman Hassan Allam in Damascus, alongside Turkish and Emirati counterparts, to discuss tourism and real estate partnerships.

The Jihadism problem

Yet, the political and security chasm continues to shadow the relationship. While capital and projects move at a steady pace, the Sharaa-Golani regime’s success in “whitewashing” its image and removing its name from terrorism lists has not resonated in Cairo.

Damascus’s attempts at bridge-building—such as the arrest of Ahmed Al-Mansour, a former Egyptian fighter in the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) who threatened the Egyptian state, or the symbolic renaming of a Homs street after the late Egyptian Chief of Staff Abdel Moneim Riad—have not been enough to secure Cairo’s trust.

According to the third source, an expert on Egyptian-Syrian relations, Cairo has rejected or expressed reservations regarding several diplomatic nominations from Damascus due to their links to groups that practiced violence. This has left the post of Ambassador vacant following the conclusion of Hussam El-Din Ala's tenure, who in 2023 had ended a twelve-year vacancy in the position.

Late last February, the Syrian government appointed Jumaa Al-Dabais Al-Anzi as representative, failing to name an ambassador to Cairo or a delegate to the Arab League. Egypt has maintained the status quo since 2012, when it withdrew its ambassador and downgraded representation to the level of Chargé d’Affaires in protest of the suppression of dissent during the Assad era. “An ambassador might eventually be appointed to Damascus, though it would not signal a fundamental shift compared to the current situation,” the third source noted.

Cairo views the post-2024 Syrian experience as a “troubling model capable of being replicated or cloned” in other regions of the Arab world, according to a fourth Egyptian diplomat who has specialized for years in terrorism and jihadist movements from the eastern Indian subcontinent to Libya.

The source, speaking to Al Manassa on condition of anonymity, indicated that Egyptian anxieties “center on the nature and history of the new regime and the unresolved file of Egyptian nationals fighting in Syria.” This file remains entirely open, alongside potential extensions of this foreign fighter model to countries geographically closer and less stable, particularly Sudan and Libya.

Here lies the deepest obsession in the Egyptian security mind: Libya and Sudan. Both countries suffer from widespread security vacuums and share direct borders with Egypt. Any expansion of the armed faction model with jihadist backgrounds transforms Syria from a distant problem into an immediate threat at the frontier.

These fears are compounded by the presence of approximately two hundred Egyptian fighters in Syria today—those remaining of the thousands who participated in the civil war from 2012 to 2024 and joined Jabhat Al-Nusra or ISIS, according to estimates from international research centers.

The new Damascus attempted to offer reassurances during the meeting. According to the first source familiar with the talks, Al-Shaar emphasized that “Egypt’s security is considered part of Syria’s security, and Syria will not be permitted to serve as a platform or sanctuary for elements targeting Egypt.” However, these pledges do not translate into immediate trust. Naturally, the talks touched upon regional issues as well as specific demands, such as the extradition of certain individuals, the adjustment of certain policies, and efforts to include all components of the Syrian people in the political process.

A Region Ablaze

According to the second source, a high-ranking diplomat, Syria is displaying increasing anxiety regarding the potential outcomes of the US war on Iran. “If it concludes in what could be considered a relative victory for Tehran, the Sharaa regime may face existential challenges. In this scenario, Iran would emerge stronger and might possess the capacity to weaken his regime, which is inherently fragile, unstable, and lacks acceptance among a wide segment of the Syrian people.”

With the fall of Assad, Iran lost a strategic corridor used to funnel supplies to Hezbollah in Lebanon. It will not abandon its ambition to recover this route or find an alternative. Because any regime in Damascus that blocks this path is, by definition, an enemy of Tehran, Sharaa remains in constant confrontation with Iranian regional calculations.

Added to this is the escalating tension between Israel and Turkey. According to the second source, Sharaa’s alliance with Ankara places him directly in the crosshairs of regional strife. “He is a close ally of Turkey. Israel, which seeks to neutralize or weaken its regional competitors, may move toward dealing with Turkey and the axis it leads, which certainly encompasses the current leadership in Damascus.”

“In any case,” noted the first source familiar with the conversations, the discussion regarding regional files was “limited.” However, the second source argues that “the mere convening of the meeting and the visit itself outweighs what transpired within it. The significance lies in the visit as a signifier of the start of relations approaching normalcy without necessarily evolving into a close friendship.”