Explainer| Can the Kurds really be a part of the new Syria, and on whose terms?

Fighting erupted earlier this month between the Syrian Arab Army and the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), following mounting pressure and US mediation for the SDF to withdraw from parts of northern Syria. With talks stalled, government forces launched operations to push SDF-affiliated security units out of contested areas, including Kurdish-majority neighbourhoods in and around Aleppo.

Amid the clashes, de facto Syrian leader Ahmed Al-Sharaa appealed directly to Kurdish audiences. He paired conciliatory language toward Kurdish civilians with calls for defections from the SDF, while recognizing Kurdish rights within a “unified” Syrian state. These moves culminated in a Jan. 18 ceasefire stipulating the integration of the two forces—a key step in Al-Sharaa’s bid to consolidate control over a territory of strategic and economic importance.

The ceasefire lasted less than 24 hours. Fighting resumed near two SDF-run prisons in northeastern Syria, killing at least nine SDF fighters and allowing around 120 ISIS detainees to escape, most of whom were later recaptured by the Syrian army. Another ceasefire was announced on Tuesday. 

What is the SDF’s role in post-Assad Syria?

The SDF occupies a pivotal, and precarious, position in Syria’s post-Assad order. Backed financially and militarily by the US since 2015, the Kurdish-led coalition was central to Washington’s campaign against ISIS.

After the fall of Bashar Al-Assad in December 2024, Al-Sharaa emerged as head of Syria’s transitional government. The former jihadist has since sought to realign the country away from Russia and Iran and toward Western powers. For the US and Israel, a unified Syria under a cooperative leadership is seen as a regional counterweight and a gateway to a resource-rich, strategically located state.

Tensions escalated in early January when the Syrian army declared Kurdish-majority areas of Aleppo under SDF control “closed military zones” and moved to retake them. State media said the SDF responded by shelling army positions, ending a months-long ceasefire.

Al-Sharaa—praised internationally for his calibrated rhetoric—then deployed those same communication skills to frame the conflict as a national project guided by pluralism and centralized political power.

How did Al-Sharaa try to win over Kurdish audiences?

On Jan. 12, as fighting continued, the Kurdish Arabic-language channel Shams recorded an interview with Al-Sharaa. Speaking directly to Kurdish viewers, he praised Kurdish resilience and framed their grievances as part of Syria’s shared history of repression.

“We acknowledge that in the past, [the Kurds] have suffered the same thing that others in Syria endured,” he said.

He then turned his criticism toward the SDF, insisting Kurdish political and cultural rights were guaranteed under the constitution, and that armed confrontation was unnecessary unless “someone uses the Kurdish issue for partisan or personal interests.” Addressing Iraqi Kurdish leader Masoud Barzani, Al-Sharaa argued that the Kurdistan Regional Government model could not be replicated in Syria.

Shams never aired the interview. Its director general, Eli Nakouzi, said the remarks—and particularly its attacks on Kurdish political figures—risked inflaming tensions and resembled a “declaration of war”.

Days later, the interview was leaked and broadcast by state-run TV channel Al-Ekhbariyah, drawing wide attention. Many Kurds condemned the remarks online, though the attempted suppression likely amplified Al-Sharaa’s message.

How did he try to unify the military?

On Jan. 16, Syria’s Ministry of Defense urged SDF fighters to defect and place themselves under the protection of the Syrian Arab Army. Though later removed from some official platforms, the statement circulated widely online.

State media soon reported “numerous requests” from SDF members seeking to defect. These claims coincided with ongoing military pressure and international calls for the SDF to withdraw from Aleppo.

The messaging mirrored Al-Sharaa’s broader strategy which presents Kurdish alignment with Damascus as a condition for protection and political inclusion. Defectors were told their decision would “preserve [their] life and future” and that “[their] homeland welcomes [them], at any time and in any place”.

That same day, Al-Sharaa issued Presidential Decree No. 13, promising equal civil and cultural rights for Kurdish Syrians. The decree recognized Kurdish as a national language, mandated its teaching in schools, and formally acknowledged Kurdish holidays and traditions.

Whether these commitments will be meaningfully implemented and how they are received within Kurdish communities remains unclear.

What happened to the ceasefire—and why didn’t it hold?

Two days later, on Jan. 18, Damascus and the SDF announced a ceasefire under a 14-point agreement outlining the integration of SDF forces into the Syrian state. The deal called for SDF withdrawal from designated areas, government control over borders and resources, and continued cooperation against extremist groups. Damascus reaffirmed its commitments under Decree No. 13.

Initially framed as a victory for Al-Sharaa, the ceasefire showcased his strategy of pairing military pressure with symbolic concessions. But it also narrowed the political space for Kurdish autonomy outside state-approved frameworks.

Its rapid collapse exposed a deeper problem. Al-Sharaa’s vision of unity relied heavily on messaging, while neglecting the logistical and political realities of integrating rival forces with competing territorial claims.

For Al-Sharaa, winning Kurdish support would grant them access to natural resources still under SDF control and enable a consolidated military command. The SDF, however, remains focused on autonomous governance east of the Euphrates in Hasakah, most of Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, and parts of northern Aleppo—regions with large Arab populations.

While some Kurds welcomed Al-Sharaa’s recognition of Kurdish identity, many opposed concessions made by SDF leaders and rejected integration into the Syrian army.

The US, once the SDF main supporter, has backed Al-Sharaa’s posture. President Donald Trump reportedly spoke with him on Jan. 19, voicing support for Syrian unity and calling resolution of the Kurdish issue essential. How Washington balances that stance with its long-standing ties to the SDF remains unresolved.

Talks between Al-Sharaa and SDF leader Mazloum Abdi collapsed the same day, after Abdi rejected demands for unconditional surrender. 

On Jan. 20, the SDF agreed to a four-day ceasefire with the Syrian army following pressure from the US government. It is unclear if the agreement will hold.

Al-Sharaa’s vision of a centralized Syrian state stands in direct opposition to Kurdish demands for autonomy within it. His promises of unity fail to address the structural challenges driving these conflicts.