Mar Elias church bombing, another failure to protect Middle East Christians

The bombing of Mar Elias Church in Damascus last month has reignited grave concerns—not only about the future of Syria’s Christians, but about the present and continued existence of Christian communities across the Middle East. Waves of persecution rarely end; they merely recede before returning in force.

The massacre at Mar Elias,which claimed the lives of at least 25 worshipers, was neither the first nor different in method or context from previous attacks in Iraq and Egypt.

While war, instability, and the lack of a shared understanding of citizenship have affected all Syrians, the consequences for religious minorities are far more severe. Christians in particular face not only a steady decline in population, but also growing marginalization from public life and an increasingly bleak outlook for their future.

Sharaa fails the test

For two decades, the plight of religious minorities has remained a topic of concern amid ongoing unrest and political conflict across much of the Middle East. Regimes have repeatedly failed to adequately respond to attacks on minorities and the discrimination they face.

In Syria, minorities were easy targets for a range of actors, state and nonstate alike, throughout the civil war. They were targeted by the Assad regime, Salafi-jihadist fighters, political opposition forces, and Turkish-backed militias, often for religious or political reasons.

Following the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024, and the rise of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham/HTS and its allies to power, the country has witnessed two diverging visions.

The first was optimistic about the success of the revolution and the end of the civil war as an opportunity to turn the page on the bloodstained legacy of the Baath Party. It held out hope that the new regime would begin to heal Syria’s wounds, bridge its internal divides, and learn from the failures of other countries in the region—countries that either descended into civil war like Libya and Sudan or witnessed the return of old regimes with even greater authoritarianism, as in Egypt.

The second view was far more cautious, marked by apprehension and fear of repeating the dismal record of Islamist regimes, which have often been defined by failure, lack of vision, and loyalty to the group above the nation.

Recent events have tilted the scales toward disappointment in both the will and the capacity of Ahmed Sharaa’s regime to oversee a peaceful transitional period, given that massacres against minorities have been on the rise.

The mass killings began with acts of revenge targeting the Alawite community, coreligionists of the Assad family. These soon escalated into near-daily incidents aimed at establishing total control by jihadist factions over Syria’s present and future. Loyalists of the HTS-dominated transitional government carried out mass sectarian attacks on civilians in the west and south of the country.

A recent report by the US Commission on International Religious Freedom, titled “Religious Freedom and US Policy in Post-Assad Syria,” documents the scope and frequency of such violations. Among the most notable are systematic harassment of Christians and efforts to impose practices that restrict their religious freedoms, such as mandatory hijab and the destruction of church crosses. The report also details cases of kidnapping, arson, and retaliatory killings of Alawites.

By March, the violence escalated into full-scale sectarian massacres targeting Alawite populations in Latakia and Tartous. Estimates indicate that between 1,700 and 2,246 people were confirmed killed, with some sources suggesting the toll is significantly higher. In May, another wave of collective killings began, this time targeting Druze communities near Damascus, resulting in at least 137 deaths. 

Shared traits

The current regime in Syria seems to be following the same trajectory as other religiously inspired governments. There are clear parallels with post-Saddam Iraq and with Egypt during and after the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood. In all cases, the ruling political class sought to court the West by portraying itself as a protector of religious minorities committed to integration and rights guarantees, but without taking any real steps to fulfill those promises.

At the same time, the ruling group forged alliances with more extreme factions in an effort to swiftly seize the levers of power. Sharaa, like the Brotherhood before him, installed loyalists with known histories of violence and extremist rhetoric in top government positions. The resulting ideological alliance demands concessions that routinely come at the expense of minorities and their rights.

Under such conditions, religious targeting increases through some of the Islamic State’s most brutal methods: bombing crowded churches or firing indiscriminately at peaceful gatherings. These acts aim to terrorize all minorities, whether religious or ethnic.

In the aftermath of each attack, regime officials and their supporters insist these are isolated incidents, not aimed at the particular sect or minority. Yet they fail to take serious action to prevent such attacks or eliminate the conditions used to justify them.

The question of identity

So far, the region’s experiences offer little cause for optimism. None of the post-uprising governments has succeeded in answering the foundational question around identity: What kind of state are we building, and who is it for? Regimes formed from religious organizations have defaulted to the dominant cultural norms of the majority.

In societies where most citizens are Muslim, and where these governing groups are socially and culturally conservative, they have moved rapidly to Islamize the state and society. They’ve formed alliances with more radical Salafi and jihadist movements. The Muslim Brotherhood’s hunger for exclusive control, and its unchecked efforts to infuse state institutions with religious dogma, became one of the primary reasons for its failure.

It appears that Sharaa’s regime is following the same path, despite Syria’s far more complex social makeup. Syria’s religious and ethnic diversity and the legacy of violent conflict among its groups demand far more cautious governance. The central question remains: Will the Syria of the future be a state with only an Islamic character, or an Islamic religious state, or a Sunni state for Sunnis only?

Answering the question of the state's identity is inseparable from another equally important question: What rights will minorities have? Will they be equal citizens, or will there be tiers of citizenship, with some groups enjoying full rights and others relegated to modern-day dhimmi status? In such a system, protected minorities receive limited rights as defined by the religious majority.

For example, Iraq established a system of governance, institutions, and legislation based on religious discrimination. The state solidified the dhimmi status for Iraqi Christians and other followers of non-Islamic religions, including Yazidis, Mandaeans, and others. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood excluded and marginalized entire groups in its pursuit of a religious constitution, with Christians among the most vocal opponents.

A justified fear

During the funeral of the Mar Elias martyrs, Patriarch Yohanna X voiced the fears of Syria’s Christians, directly criticizing Sharaa’s regime for its inadequate response to the massacre. He noted that no senior officials visited the church, save for a Christian minister, and that, unlike Muslim victims of similar incidents, the Christian dead were not officially honored as martyrs. The patriarch emphasized that an event of this magnitude demanded far more than a mere condolence call.

He affirmed that Christians are an essential component of Syria and will remain so, despite these tragedies. He expressed hope that the government will deliver on the revolution’s promises of democracy, freedom, and equality, grounded in the rule of law for all. Addressing Sharaa directly, he said: “We extended our hands to you to help build a new Syria, but sadly we are still waiting for you to reach back.”

Just as the feeling of security and safety requires more than simply assigning guards to a church or place of worship, fostering the foundations of coexistence and combating a climate of hatred demands more than just resonant speeches. It requires policies of inclusion, leading to genuine understandings for a citizenship that embraces diversity, starting with the individual, and simultaneously recognizing and guaranteeing the cultural rights of all groups in our societies.

What is happening in Syria, and what may unfold in neighboring countries, is deeply troubling. Minorities are being sacrificed as scapegoats for the ruling systems’ failure to establish modern, inclusive states built on citizenship, equality, justice, and participation in public life.

Naturally, no single remedy can undo decades of deep-rooted, inherited problems. Political and social crises cannot be solved overnight. Nor can the role of religion in society be redefined instantly. Yet urgent action, both symbolic and substantive, is needed to signal that a better future is possible. Our nations are worth the struggle. They are worth the pain of rebuilding on sound foundations that safeguard citizens’ lives, dignity, and rights, without fear of an uncertain tomorrow.