Lapid's playbook: Arab allies for Israel's ‘dirty work’

The desert winds carried a potent political message last week as former Israeli Prime Minister Yair Lapid touched down in the UAE.

His meetings with Emirati officials and his revealing interview with Egyptian journalist Emad El-Din Adeeb underscored a clear agenda, one quickly understood by pro-Netanyahu circles, especially after Lapid publicly celebrated his camaraderie with Abu Dhabi's leadership.

Netanyahu's camp seethed, with Maariv citing sources expressing “protest and annoyance” over what the prime minister's aides denounced as “inappropriate interference in domestic affairs”—a clear jab at Emirati support for his political rivals.

The perceived snub was particularly galling given that Mohammed bin Zayed had previously welcomed former PM Naftali Bennett, yet Netanyahu has received no official invitation to Abu Dhabi, nor met the Emirati leader since the Abraham Accords were signed in 2020.

The signals from the UAE were not lost on Netanyahu’s camp; they directly converged with Lapid’s aggressive campaign to position himself as the premier alternative. Lapid dedicated significant airtime in his interview with Adeeb to his would-have-been decisions during October 7, while concurrently campaigning among pro-Israel lobbyists in the US and Europe.

Inside Israel, however, Lapid's series of tours has failed to reverse a rapidly declining popularity, with recent polls indicating his support is eroding faster than Netanyahu’s, and his base fracturing towards Avigdor Lieberman and Yair Golan. This precarious position is set to worsen if Naftali Bennett enters the race leading a new party.

Still, Lapid retains the title of “opposition leader,” which lends him extra weight.

During a visit to Washington last February, he presented right-wing politicians and pro-Israel lobbies with a proposal to end the war in Gaza. At its core is a 15-year Egyptian mandate over the territory in exchange for financial incentives to Egypt, including debt write-offs.

Why Egypt?

Because, as he put it, “Egypt knows how to fight terror,” and is a “strong, moderate, pragmatic Sunni state, a crucial player in the region.” Egypt responded officially, and firmly, with rejection.

The other side of a rusty coin

Just as Netanyahu believes power can crush resistance and deliver gains, Lapid is selling the flip side of the same rusty Zionist coin: everything can be bought, including persuading Arabs to do Israel’s dirty work.

Drawing on his media savvy to appeal to both domestic and international public opinion, Lapid pushes a message that in essence differs little from Netanyahu’s, which The Jerusalem Post even cited as reason for his falling popularity.

While Netanyahu's strength lies in overt shows of force, Lapid's distinctions emerge in his preferred framework and implementation methods. He seems to navigate political territories Netanyahu deliberately avoids to maintain a tougher image, deftly downplaying obstacles.

Lapid's vision paints a picture of peace with Arab nations—on Israeli terms—as the ultimate solution to the Palestinian question, aiming to dismantle Hamas and all resistance with minimal military effort and optimized cost.

To secure his position as Netanyahu's successor in the eyes of Israeli lobby, Lapid frequently dismisses inconvenient truths, championing his own “alternative truths” instead. He's careful not to undo Israel's successes—its rise as the region's top military power and the irreparable blows to Iran and its proxies.

Instead, he proposes a strategic shift: ushering in an era where Egypt and other Arab allies are tasked with finishing what Netanyahu couldn't—crushing resistance and bringing lasting calm to Gaza and the West Bank.

During his September 2022 UN General Assembly speech, then-Prime Minister Lapid offered a seemingly conciliatory gesture by claiming a “large majority of Israelis” backed a two-state solution.

Yet, this olive branch came heavily qualified: the future Palestinian state must be disarmed, and Hamas and Islamic Jihad purged from any authority. He framed this as a non-negotiable safeguard against Gaza or the West Bank becoming “another terror base” threatening Israel's very existence, while also celebrating Israel as a “dazzling cultural mosaic.”

Netanyahu, then the opposition figure lying in wait, denounced Lapid’s speech as one “full of weakness, defeat, and bowing of the head. ... bringing Palestinians back to the forefront of the world stage.” He accused Lapid of endangering Israel’s future by even mentioning the two-state solution.

Genocide's buried truths

From a fresh Western analytical perspective, now embraced by certain Arab circles who view Al-Aqsa Flood as the conflict's genesis, Lapid's past pronouncements suddenly appear remarkably positive, even “great.” This re-evaluation suggests a potential for cooperation with the Israeli opposition, envisioning a future free from the constraints of Netanyahu’s “deterrence-based peace.”

The ongoing assault, cloaked in propaganda, often overshadows Lapid’s own record, which includes some of the most devastating events in the years preceding the genocidal war on Gaza.

It was under his political authority that “Operation Breaking Dawn” targeted Islamic Jihad's military leadership through Israel's signature preemptive strikes. The siege on Gaza remained airtight on his watch—a policy he justified to the UN by citing his autistic daughter's need to flee “terrorist rockets” at 3 am, a rationale later challenged by critical journalist Gideon Levy, who questioned the fate of Gaza's children.

Furthermore, Lapid's record includes his strong opposition to a UN investigation into alleged war crimes from the 2021 “Operation Guardian of the Walls.” In a move that echoed current Israeli leadership, then-Prime Minister Lapid sharply criticized UN Secretary-General António Guterres, proclaiming, “We’re facing a wave of anti-Semitic incidents and blatant hostility toward Israel in this UN inquiry. Slurs about a Jewish lobby that acts to control the media are reminiscent of the darkest days of modern history.”

Just two months after his naïve UN speech, Lapid defended Israeli massacres in the West Bank, including the assassination of Al Jazeera journalist Shireen Abu Akleh. He vehemently rejected a potential US investigation led by the FBI and resisted calls from the Biden administration for Israel’s justice ministry to cooperate.

In his recent UAE interview, Lapid once again lauded the Israeli military as an army that “helps its enemies.”

Yet, in a stark display of hypocrisy, he simultaneously championed a two-state solution while actively boycotting the Palestinian Authority and refusing to meet its president, Mahmoud Abbas, due to Abbas' talk of “fifty holocausts” endured by Palestinians since the Nakba.

Who’s behind Lapid, and why?

Lapid's strategy isn't one of outright deceit, but a calculated move to sanitize Netanyahu's bombastic rhetoric. By shedding the aggressive theatrics, he renders the same underlying ideas far more attractive to audiences uncomfortable with Netanyahu’s blatant belligerence.

Consider the Golan Heights, a point of absolute consensus for both Netanyahu and Lapid—it will never be relinquished.

Netanyahu has publicly anchored this stance in strategic necessity for decades. Lapid, however, rationalizes it by claiming the Golan is “inherently Israeli,” arguing, “We have controlled it more than the Syrians ever did.” This position is particularly telling when, in the same breath, he offers Egypt debt relief to manage Gaza or absorb its population, while stipulating that Syria can only rebuild if it orbits closer to Israel, effectively abandoning any claim to the Golan.

Another striking contrast lies in their diplomatic rhetoric. While Netanyahu once provocatively suggested Saudi Arabia could host Palestinians on its “vast lands,” Lapid now presents normalization with Riyadh as the “linchpin of a new Middle East.” He even told Al-Majalla he remained hopeful for this outcome “despite the terrorists who wanted to derail normalization with the Oct. 7 attacks,” further emphasizing Israel's “fruitful and strong” relations with Egypt.

Ultimately, the marketing of Lapid and his plans isn’t arbitrary. It likely falls into one or more of four possibilities. Perhaps he’s jockeying for personal political gain, trying to reap the fruits of Netanyahu’s accomplishments. Alternatively, he might be actively promoted by certain pro-Israel lobbies, American figures, or regional powers aiming for a leadership change that could rein in military spending and de-escalate tensions.

Meanwhile, some parties might also genuinely believe he can continue Israel’s Zionist reengineering of the region with a lighter touch. He could also simply be a tool to push Netanyahu toward a more conciliatory approach with particular Arab regimes.

Regardless of the specific drivers, Lapid’s plan carries perilous ramifications. His “day after" scenario cynically relies on embroiling Egypt in an exhausting mandate, driving a wedge between Cairo and the Palestinian people and resistance movements.

Crucially, his aim is not to utilize Arab money for authentic reconstruction or to uplift lives in the West Bank. It is, rather, a cold calculation to impose a puppet regime—a force he evidently desired in power immediately after October 7—one engineered to crush internal dissent on Israel’s behalf and finally bury any enduring dream of a sovereign Palestinian state.