Woe to the Victor: The Democrats’ trap after the midterms
The US midterm results set off celebrations that reached well beyond Democratic supporters and echoed around the world. It felt as though the ballot box had marked the beginning of the end of the right-wing populist project tied to Donald Trump’s rise. Some saw it as a political shift that would restore the standing of progressives and open the door to a rethink of the economic and social policies that fueled right-wing populism.
But electoral history counsels caution. In Greece, the anti-austerity coalition Syriza won in 2015 and splintered within months, its promises colliding with the terms of the European bailout. In Chile, Gabriel Boric’s 2021 victory did not hold his reform coalition together: the strains of governing, then the 2022 rejection of the draft constitution, quickly exposed how little the coalition agreed on about what transformation was possible.
None of this means that victory automatically breeds division. But forces that can defeat their opponents have not necessarily settled their own disputes over what they are for, and victory can hasten the exposure of contradictions that were shelved during the campaign.
Hence the paradox of the Democrats’ win. They managed to rally diverse social and political forces against the Trump administration, but not to resolve the contradictions among them. Those contradictions are not new; they have only sharpened and grown more polarizing as the party comes under mounting pressure to show tangible results before the 2028 presidential election.
A victory that settles nothing
Discontent with the Trump administration is not the same as a retreat of the currents that fed right-wing populism. Voters can punish Republicans over rising prices and still believe in economic nationalism, protectionism, or anti-minority rhetoric.
Right-wing populism is bigger than Trump’s personality or governing style. It rests on deeper economic, social and cultural anxieties, and on a feeling among parts of American society that traditional institutions no longer represent them or answer their demands. A dip in Trump’s electoral fortunes, then, does not preclude the movement re-forming under new leadership: perhaps less confrontational, and better able to speak to voters’ economic and social fears.
Nor do the wins of several progressive figures, or even the retaking of both houses of Congress, show that the party has rebuilt its social and economic coalitions around a common platform. Rallying the votes of Trump’s opponents is not the same as agreeing on what should replace his policies.
That is the real dilemma.
Old contradictions
The Democratic Party’s divisions did not begin with this election. Historically it has been a broad coalition of divergent economic and social interests and political orientations, and it has still managed to deliver significant social reforms.
Many of those reforms, though, particularly in recent decades, have been hemmed in by the very economic system that produced the inequalities and crises they set out to address.
Today, with demands mounting to raise purchasing power, provide housing, expand public services and regulate big corporations, the economic and political choices the party has habitually put off have become far more bitterly contested.
Democrats do not disagree about whether living standards must improve. What they lack is consensus on which interests to take on to get there.
For example, can public services be expanded on a large scale without placing additional burdens on corporations and concentrated wealth? Can housing costs come down without confronting certain real estate interests? Can the party curb Big Tech while influential sectors of its own coalition depend on the industry’s continued expansion?
These are not just technical quarrels over policy tools or timing. They reflect economic and social interests that may prove hard to reconcile, even inside one party.
The contradictions have already surfaced in several states. In Virginia, tax exemptions for data centers split Democratic officials: some defended the incentives as a way to attract investment, others wanted them pared back given the strain these projects put on power grids and public resources. The compromise kept the exemptions but added a tax on energy consumption, leaving the fight over who bears the costs of that investment unsettled.
In California, the housing crisis opened a rift between Democrats pushing deregulated construction and a bigger housing supply, and those demanding stronger tenant protections and affordable housing. The latter feared that concessions to developers would simply entrench the developers’ interests without adequately addressing the social crisis.
What matters about these two examples is not that Democrats disagree—big-tent parties always do—but the kind of economic and social interests the rival positions speak for.
The party has long lived with these contradictions without settling the choices they force. It may keep putting them off through the coming legislative term, majority or no majority. But continued postponement, combined with rising demands for better living standards, could make the victory itself a source of fresh strain on party unity.
Enter Israel
The contradictions are not confined to how resources are distributed or how far the state should intervene in the economy. US military aid to Israel has become another arena of conflict with no easy resolution, both inside the Democratic Party and between it and the Republicans.
Abdul El-Sayed’s win in the Michigan Senate race is a revealing case. The progressive candidate won despite sharp intraparty divisions over Israel’s security and the limits of US backing, and even after his former primary rival, Haley Stevens, endorsed the Republican candidate.
His victory shows the electoral room widening for positions that have long run up against the party establishment’s red lines. However, it does not mean those red lines have vanished, or that the dispute over them is settled.
Indeed, on the morning of the election Trump added a new dimension to the fight, announcing an agreement with Netanyahu to halt US military aid to Israel by the end of the year. He pointedly noted that candidates like Abdul El-Sayed were using the aid issue to attack Republicans. How the announcement would be carried out remains unclear, and the current aid agreement runs through 2028, but his statements show the issue has become an electoral flashpoint that reaches beyond Democratic divisions and into the rivalry between the parties.
It is unlikely to be settled quickly. The debate is not only about the volume or cost of military aid; it is about the nature of the strategic alliance, the limits of the US commitment to Israel’s security, and the political and institutional interests invested in keeping that support going.
So the Democrats’ electoral success is no guarantee of a shared stance on an issue now fiercely contested inside and outside the party. The progressive wing’s success may instead intensify pressure to revise some bedrock assumptions of US foreign policy, but that does not mean the party’s factions are ready to agree on a revision.
Who gets to remold the party?
The contradictions grow knottier with no coordinated vision or platform between the party’s traditional leadership and its rising new faces. Both can beat Republicans at the ballot box without arriving at a common view of how to redistribute resources, rein in the economic power of major corporations, or revisit certain long-standing political and strategic assumptions.
But this is not simply a matter of better coordination between the traditional leadership and the new faces, or of compromises on particular policies. The deeper question is how far the party’s dominant forces are prepared to make way for new leadership to take the helm and help redefine its priorities and platform.
Such a shift would be more than a change of faces or rhetoric. It could mean a redistribution of influence within the party, and the possible loss of the traditional alliances and the political and economic bases of support it has relied on for decades.
Can the party’s traditional leaders accept such a transformation, with all its risks and potential losses? Or will the rising forces’ electoral success stop at widening the party’s base, leaving untouched the balance of power that sets its course?
Nor are the rising forces a homogeneous current with a ready-made, shared project. They come from diverse social and political backgrounds, with different experiences, priorities, and ideas about how far economic and social reform can go. Their rise to the forefront will not end the party’s disputes; it reopens the negotiation over its leadership, alliances and platform, bringing both the promise of change and the risk of fracture.
The dilemma cuts two ways. It hinges on whether the traditional leadership will cede some of its influence, and whether the rising forces can forge a consensus that carries them beyond their individual successes to a broader party project.
Even if such a transformation is possible, it won’t necessarily be swift, and its outcome is far from certain.
Two years under pressure
Time, here, deepens the dilemma. The victory gave the party a majority in both chambers of Congress, a chance to rein in some of the Trump administration’s choices and to oversee its policies more tightly. It did not give the party the executive branch, nor the ability to push through a comprehensive reform program without running into a presidential veto and disputes in its own ranks.
Institutional constraints are not the only obstacle to reform. Even if the Democrats’ powers expanded, the contradictions between the interests they represent would persist.
Meanwhile, voters cannot afford to wait for these contradictions to be settled. Even if inflation falls, prices will not return to their old levels, and improving purchasing power requires tangible changes in wages as well as in the cost of housing, energy and services.
The war on Iran has multiplied these pressures, bringing higher energy costs and other economic burdens in its wake. That fallout may have swelled the protest vote against Republicans, but it does not necessarily hand Democrats the means to resolve the cost-of-living crisis that helped deliver their victory.
As 2028 approaches, the pressure to deliver quick results may sharpen, while the differences within the Democratic coalition make agreeing on the necessary reforms harder still.
Time does not create the party’s contradictions, but it raises the political cost of leaving them unaddressed. The rising forces may face a particular bind: their electoral success has raised expectations that they can change public policy, yet the balance of forces within the party and its institutions does not automatically let them enact their platform.
The Democrats may have won at the polls, but they have yet to banish the specter of right-wing populism from American political life. If they cannot turn their new positions into a chance to build a political project that answers the economic and social crisis, persistent inflation and internal division may give right-wing populism the opening to renew itself under different leadership.
That is the trap of victory: new forces help the coalition weaken its opponent at the polls, yet the balance of power and interests inside the party keeps those forces from taking the lead and building a project capable of resolving the crises that fueled that opponent’s rise.