How IMF loans created Egypt’s decade of economic decay
Egypt has signed a string of loan agreements with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) over the past ten years, the latest of which expires this December. The Fund maintains that the “reforms” it prescribed have made the economy more resilient to shocks. The crises of recent months, regional and global, say otherwise: the economy has become more fragile, not less.
In ten years, external debt has roughly tripled, the economy has leaned more heavily on foreign borrowing to finance it, and the pound has lost about 84% of its value. Millions of Egyptians have watched their living standards collapse under successive waves of price rises, all under austerity programs the government agreed to with the IMF.
The latest loan agreement ends this December, but the effects of the policies it carried will not leave with the Fund. The economy remains fragile, and the government’s vision for the next phase differs little from the path the IMF laid down over the past several years.
What happened to our debt
The last ten years can fairly be called ‘the IMF era,’ and its defining feature is an unprecedented rise in Egypt’s external debt. In the summer of 2016, debt stood at no more than $55.8 billion, a mere 16% of GDP at the time. Under the first program of IMF “reforms,” which ran for only three years, it more than doubled, to about $108 billion.
Agreement followed agreement over the decade, and they were no longer confined to the Fund. They came to include loans from a range of international lenders, chiefly the Gulf states, the European Union and several international financial institutions, along with commercial banks. External debt now stands at $164.7 billion, about 40% of current GDP.
Under the weight of these debts on the state’s finances, and with foreign currency in short supply, the government has turned to selling off assets, or the right to exploit them, and using the proceeds to pay down debt, as in the Ras El-Hekma deal. The effect was very limited. Debt soon began climbing again, as the chart below shows
Some argue that these debts pose no danger because repayment is spread over decades. But the obligations still demand hard-currency liquidity on fixed dates, in a country that imports much of what it needs to live on and whose income is easily buffeted by outside forces. The result is a recurring repayment crisis.
Conditions that miss the problem
IMF programs impose a familiar set of measures, drawn from a standard diagnosis of what causes crises, whatever the differences between countries. The Fund sees floating the currency and leaving it to market forces as an effective way to fix balance-of-payments problems. It holds that cutting public spending is the route to fiscal discipline. And it recommends programs to dispose of state-owned assets and make room for the private sector, on the premise that this guarantees sustainable growth.
Yet applying these measures did not lift the economy out of its deep crises; though the government did not comply with them in full. The Fund’s idea of a cure leaves the economy’s structural weaknesses untouched and, in more than one way, aggravates them.
The Fund’s insistence on devaluation did nothing to ease the structural imbalances in the balance of payments. The improvement over the past decade came mainly from the loans Egypt took on during the period, or from sales of public assets. Both carry a future cost, and neither touches the root of the problem: the economy’s failure to produce enough goods and services.
To be fair, IMF policies did lead to a unified exchange rate, which is a positive. Higher interest rates also drew investors to Egyptian debt, which supplied hard currency and helped lift the central bank’s reserves. But these remain fragile fixes that do not reach the economy’s structural roots, and they came at a heavy price.
The 2016 float, for instance, rested on the Fund’s mistaken estimate of its social consequences. It expected consumer price inflation to rise by only about 18% as a result. In practice it reached 30%, eroding the living standards of millions and deepening poverty and inequality.
Further devaluations followed, until the dollar reached 56 Egyptian pounds in recent days, against 8.8 a decade ago. Egyptians have lived through waves of price rises with no benefit from the reforms to show for it.
And after all this suffering in the name of “reform,” the Fund expects Egypt’s financing needs to stay at 40% of GDP for the next three years. That means more borrowing to meet them, because the reforms, quite simply, have not solved the economy’s problems.
Who is really behind the pound’s slide?
The pound’s fall to a record low a few days ago cannot be separated from the path Egypt has followed with the Fund over the past ten years. Regional and international developments did play an important part. But the main cause was the government’s IMF-backed policy.
The pound’s roughly 17% decline against the dollar since the start of the year is tied to the war the United States and Israel launched on Iran last March. The immediate cause, however, is Egypt’s heavy reliance on hot money as a principal source of hard currency, despite its well-known volatility. That leaves the currency, and the economy behind it, at the mercy of speculators.
The government uses high interest rates to lure foreign investors into buying the Treasury bills it issues, which gets it easy dollars in short order. Foreign holdings of government debt reached $55 billion last June. But the government is forced to find those dollars at once if investors decide to sell, whether because of a crisis, a market swing, or a better return elsewhere.
That is what happened in recent days. The president asked parliament for authorization to send troops to help defend Saudi Arabia, and the odds of a fresh strike on Iran rose. Investors grew alarmed at the mounting risk and began pulling out of the market.
With Egypt’s hard-currency resources limited and installments and interest on its external debt falling due one after another, foreign holdings of local debt are a major source of fragility to outside shocks. Notably, the Fund itself flags the risks of Egypt’s “reliance on short-term domestic financing” even as it praises the economy’s resilience and encourages keeping interest rates high.
Interest rates and mounting burdens
The Fund defends higher rates as a conventional tool against inflation, and its program reviews on Egypt have accordingly mostly recommended tight monetary policy. Many economists see the tool as having limited effect on inflation in Egypt’s circumstances. Even so, rates stayed high through the ten years Egypt applied IMF programs, and when inflation eased, they did not fall by much.
The danger of keeping rates high for so long lies in the damage to public finances, since the state is the largest borrower in the domestic market. The profits flow to its lenders, chiefly the banks.
Despite the risks, the government holds to this course because it brings in hard currency through foreign investment in government debt, which high rates attract. Yields on Treasury bills have therefore stayed around 25%, while bank interest rates have eased to between 19% and 20%.
IMF programs aim chiefly at the overall budget deficit, the gap between public revenue and spending once debt repayments are set aside, in order to restore fiscal balance. But keeping rates high all these years swelled interest payments until they exceeded the very deficit the Fund is supposed to be treating. This year’s budget carries a deficit of about 1.5 trillion Egyptian pounds against interest payments of 2.4 trillion pounds. Debt service now feeds the deficit.
Debt service and reserves
Before the borrowing spree, external debt was about a third of today’s level: $55.8 billion in FY2015/16. At the time, the cost of servicing that debt (installments and interest) a decade later, in FY2025/26, was projected to be about $1.3 billion. The expansion of short- and long-term debt has pushed repayment obligations to more than 50 times that projection, to about $51.2 billion.
The weight of these payments on the economy shows when set against exports of goods and services, one measure of economic soundness. External debt service reached 53.6% of Egypt’s exports in June 2025. Exports grew about 23% in FY2024/25, but the effect of that gain shrinks as the cost of debt service climbs.
Fund programs did succeed in raising Egypt’s reserves, but debt obligations hem them in. Debt service due within a year or less (short-term debt plus the installments of long-term loans maturing within twelve months) stood at $63.7 billion last December, about 124% of foreign-exchange reserves.
In other words, the reserves, which are supposed to cover Egypt’s external obligations, imports above all, do not even cover what is due in the short run. That is especially so if a political or economic crisis prevents the usual rolling over of some short-term debts.
The ratio hit its worst in December 2023, at about 166% of reserves, at the height of the foreign-currency shortage. It has since fallen gradually, for two reasons: debt shrank after the Ras El-Hekma deal, and reserves rose from $35 billion at the time of the crisis to $48.7 billion last June.
The risk of heavy short-term obligations relative to reserves is plain given what the region is going through: political and security crises in which alliances may shift in ways that could put heavy pressure on Egypt’s economy. Concerns have already arisen over the $5 billion Saudi deposit, which press reports later said had been renewed.
Life after the Fund
Although it played a central role in piling up Egypt’s external loans for nearly ten years, the IMF warns in its own reports of the risks of rising debt and the burden of interest. There is hope that the current financing program will be the last in this series when its final stage ends this December, and that the government will keep its promise not to seek a new loan and to rely instead on a “homegrown” program of economic transformation.
Such a program requires a clear plan for escaping the debt trap within a reasonable time. It requires a change of course from the one that accompanied the borrowing boom, which went into financing unproductive projects of no developmental priority. It also needs alternatives to the hot money the government has leaned on so heavily amid today’s regional and international instability, and it must finally address the economy’s structural weaknesses.
What matters is not just ending dependence on the IMF, but changing the basic assumptions on which the last decade’s “economic reform” was built.