Interview| Iran’s envoy in Cairo: ‘Millions in the streets are stronger than any nuclear bomb’

On a busy street in Dokki, Giza, behind an unassuming gate stands Iran’s embassy just a few minutes’ walk from the Nile. A building that, on ordinary days, resembles the few surviving old villas now crammed between the high-rise buildings. But this was no ordinary day.

In the early hours of Wednesday, July 8, US airstrikes targeted more than 80 sites in southern Iran, shattering a fragile ceasefire between the two countries. Within hours, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had announced strikes on US military positions in Bahrain and Kuwait, triggering air raid sirens in both countries for the first time since the so-called ceasefire.

The renewed escalation coincided with the week-long mourning period for Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Nine hundred kilometers away, in the Iraqi city of Najaf, his coffin was making its way toward the Shrine of Imam Ali, another stop in an elaborate six-day funeral procession that passed through five Iranian and Iraqi cities before concluding in Mashhad, the former leader’s birthplace.

When we arrived at the embassy to meet Mojtaba Ferdosipour, head of Iran’s Interests Section in Egypt, neither of those events seemed to register much inside. There were no television screens broadcasting the funeral attended by hundreds of thousands of Iraqis, nor did anyone seem to be following US President Donald Trump’s announcement that the ceasefire was “over” and the drums of war were beating once again.

There was never a real ceasefire

That said, Ferdosipour bluntly rejected the notion that a ceasefire with the US had ever existed.

“We never saw a genuine ceasefire from the very outset. What took place was what was described as a ‘mutual understanding’ signed by US President Donald Trump and Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.”

“Even then, we never saw any practical implementation of that understanding,” he continued, “which stipulated the lifting of sanctions, the release of frozen Iranian assets, a ceasefire in Lebanon, and the withdrawal of the Israeli entity. Unfortunately, however, we continue to witness Israeli attacks and aggression against the Lebanese Republic.”

That was how our conversation with Ferdosipour began. He welcomed us with the composure of a seasoned diplomat. What had initially been arranged as a retrospective assessment of the course of the war turned overnight into a discussion of a far more immediate and dangerous reality.

Throughout the interview, Ferdosipour repeatedly returned to what he described as US violations of the agreements: “The mutual understanding between Iran and the United States was breached from the very beginning. One of the clearest examples concerns the Strait of Hormuz.

The understanding stipulated that the Islamic Republic of Iran would oversee post-war arrangements in the strait, an arrangement that was approved and signed by President Trump, his administration and the White House at the time. But from the moment the agreement was signed, we were met with pressure and violations aiming to create an alternative shipping corridor south of the strait, outside the agreed framework. The primary purpose of this corridor is to facilitate the movement of US warships and aircraft carriers.”

Ferdosipour arrived in Cairo about a year ago, at a time when Egyptian-Iranian relations were only just moving beyond a phase of cautious rapprochement. Egypt had played a significant role in efforts to defuse tensions between Tehran and the International Atomic Energy Agency, although those efforts ultimately failed to avert the war.

In 1991, Egypt and Iran agreed to resume relations, which had been severed following the 1979 Iranian Revolution. They stopped short, however, of exchanging ambassadors or reopening fully fledged embassies; instead, the two countries agreed to maintain diplomatic representation through “interests sections.” As a result, although he holds ambassadorial rank within Iran’s Foreign Ministry, on paper Ferdosipour serves as head of Iran’s Interests Section in Egypt.

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Targeting the Gulf

Until this week, the war’s spillover into the Gulf appeared to be subsiding, even if that relative calm was accompanied by quiet anxiety in capitals that had sought to stay out of the confrontation between Washington and Tehran. Over recent months, Gulf states have been searching for alternatives to their heavy reliance on US security guarantees, having experienced firsthand the costs of that dependence.

Yet whatever their military rationale, strikes on Bahraini and Kuwaiti territory could strengthen the Gulf capitals’ incentive to cling to the American security umbrella. The question of what Tehran expects from countries that have spent months under siege and within range of the fighting remains unanswered.

There is no evidence linking the current escalation to NATO’s summit in Ankara

“We expect the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states to act without delay, to ensure that their territory is not used as a military base by the United States or Israel. Unfortunately, US Central Command, or CENTCOM, remains in place. It treats the Gulf as the joint operations room from which Iran is targeted. Attacks are launched from wherever that command is located in those countries—that is why we stress that US and Israeli bases, along with CENTCOM headquarters, remain present.”

Notably, the veteran diplomat—who wears his watch with the face turned inward, a habit associated with military personnel—did not stop at calling for the Gulf to free itself from US military bases. He spoke enthusiastically about rebuilding Gulf–Iranian relations based on partnership rather than mutual suspicion as an alternative to the US-led security framework.

“Understandings were reached on the sidelines of the agreement with the United States. We agreed with the GCC states to hold a meeting bringing together the GCC countries and the Republic of Iraq, either at the level of heads of state or foreign ministers. The meeting was expected to take place within the next ten days, despite the current escalation.”

The envoy revealed that Iran and the Gulf states had already reached a consensus on holding the meeting, which was due to take place in Riyadh to discuss key security, economic, and political issues.

“I believe this initiative remains on the table. These meetings are expected to introduce proposals aimed at establishing a shared regional security framework among all the countries of the region, while also exploring ways to strengthen economic cooperation between Iran and the GCC states.”

A peace deal inked in Switzerland tested in Ankara

The war’s latest escalation did not emerge in a vacuum. In the two days before our interview, Iranian forces had targeted three commercial vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz—a Qatari-flagged liquefied natural gas carrier, a Saudi-flagged crude oil tanker and a third commercial ship—in the most serious breach yet of arrangements that had swung since April between the strait’s complete closure and its reluctant partial reopening.

The US military response was swift and forceful, ordering strikes on Southern Iran. At the same time, Washington revoked the sanctions waiver on Iranian oil that it had granted Tehran less than three weeks earlier under the memorandum of understanding signed in June. Iran’s chief negotiator described the reversal as “a clear violation” of the agreement.

What makes this latest round different, however, is its timing. The strikes were ordered while Trump was in Ankara for the NATO summit, on the sidelines of which allied foreign ministers were meeting with their Gulf counterparts to discuss instability in the Strait of Hormuz.

Ferdosipour rejected the suggestion that the escalation was coordinated between Washington and its NATO or Gulf allies.

“First, there is no evidence linking the current escalation to the NATO summit in Ankara, or showing that it was carried out in connection with that meeting. Second, the clearest proof that we do not seek escalation is that we are still observing the week of mourning and funeral ceremonies for the Supreme Leader. His body is due to return to his family and to Iran amid risks that have become evident to everyone. Third, I would like to stress that, during the last meeting in Doha—held shortly before the Supreme Leader’s funeral—we reached an understanding with the American side on two key issues that were on the table: the release of frozen Iranian assets and Lebanon.”

“Through Qatari mediation, we also agreed to begin a new round of dialogue with the United States after the week of mourning in Iran. This upcoming round has been described as a ‘technical dialogue’ because it will focus on technical issues and implementation details. So why would Iran escalate after agreeing to such a process? To claim that Iran is escalating would mean that we are going back on what was agreed in Doha, and that is simply not true.”

The Iranian diplomat called on Washington to honor “all 14 provisions that we negotiated and signed as part of the joint understanding. We call for this understanding to remain in place and be fully implemented by both us and Washington, so it can serve as the governing framework for our bilateral relations. Under Article 5 of the understanding, Iran has the right to secure and guarantee safe passage and through the strait to prevent any dangers that may arise in the region.”

The mass funeral procession for the Supreme Leader is our real nuclear weapon

Against this backdrop, Ferdosipour does not believe the Strait of Hormuz has become an intractable crisis or a pressure point that could force Iran into making concessions on other issues. When we asked whether the escalating tensions over the strait had made Tehran less hardline on its nuclear program, he flatly rejected the premise, insisting that the Strait of Hormuz crisis was never a tool of Iran’s own making but a direct consequence of the US–Israeli war against his country. As evidence, he noted that Tehran had not closed the strait even during the 12-day war that preceded the current conflict.

When asked about the nuclear issue, the envoy invoked a religious decree, saying that the new Supreme Leader, Mojtaba Khamenei, “remains committed to it,” just as his father was before him. The cited fatwa declares the possession of nuclear weapons to be religiously forbidden because they kill innocent people. At the same time, he reaffirmed Tehran’s right, as a member of both the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the International Atomic Energy Agency, to develop peaceful nuclear technology for electricity generation, medicine, agriculture, and other civilian purposes. Ferdosipour argued that Washington’s real objective is not nuclear disarmament but control over Iran’s oil and gas fields, drawing a parallel to the strategy being employed in Venezuela. Yet he insisted that Iran possesses what he regards as an alternative form of deterrence.

“We possess something more powerful than nuclear weapons. The millions who took part in the funeral procession for the Supreme Leader are our real nuclear weapon. The sight of millions filling the streets, in the heat of summer, for six consecutive days—not only in Iran but also in the Republic of Iraq—is the clearest possible proof of the people’s unwavering support for the system and its leadership. I believe that nearly 20 million people taking to the streets represents a force far greater than any nuclear capability.”

Here in Cairo

If Ankara cast a shadow over Washington’s decisions, Cairo has its own parallel story about how the war has reshaped the region’s balance of power. For much of the past half-century, relations between Egypt and Iran were defined by estrangement. Diplomatic ties were severed in 1979, after President Anwar Sadat’s decided to give refuge to the deposed Shah in Cairo. Tehran also viewed Egypt’s peace treaty with Israel as a profound setback. For decades, contact between the region’s two most populous and historically influential states was limited to mutual interests sections and discreet back channels.

That ice had already begun to thaw before the war began. Egypt, however, has paid a tangible price for the conflict, with rising oil prices and declining Suez Canal revenues placing additional strain on an already weakened economy. At the same time, Cairo faced quiet reproach from its Gulf allies, who saw its cautious approach toward Tehran as falling short of the solidarity they had expected. Over time, that pressure prompted Egypt to demonstrate greater support for the Gulf states, including the symbolic deployment of Egyptian forces to several Gulf countries, underscoring Cairo’s long-standing position that Gulf security is inseparable from Egypt’s own.

“As long as regional security is not harmed, we do not see this as something negative but rather as a positive development. We fully support the concept of regional, or collective, security. I believe Egypt is handling this issue with great wisdom and is doing everything in its power to reduce tensions across the region. Its efforts in this regard have been genuine and tangible.”

The envoy continued: “As for Egyptian–Emirati relations, both countries have every right to strengthen and develop their bilateral ties, provided this does not come at the expense of regional security. Countries in the region have the right to support one another within a vision founded on collective security. We hope that all regional states will contribute to advancing this idea, leading to stronger partnerships and closer economic, security, and political cooperation between Iran and the rest of the region.”

Lebanon is a red line for the Islamic Republic of Iran, and we will not cross that red line in any agreement with USA

Since the war began, communication channels between Cairo and Tehran have remained open. Egypt folded those contacts into a broader four-party initiative with Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. The initiative was launched in Riyadh before meeting again in Islamabad and Antalya, and the four countries now hope to develop it into a permanent regional security framework that would not depend on the United States in the event of future crises. Whether Tehran ultimately sees these emerging arrangements as genuine partnerships or as structures that will eventually align themselves with Gulf and US interests remains an open question.

Ferdosipour insists that Egypt did everything in its power to prevent escalation and avert a war against Iran, describing Cairo’s efforts as sincere and deeply appreciated.

“Despite the different paths events have taken—as we saw during the 12-day war and the 40-day war—I would stress that we have worked tirelessly to remove every obstacle standing in the way of our bilateral relationship with Cairo, and we have succeeded. Most importantly, Egypt and Iran have placed the train of bilateral relations firmly on the right track. We are seeking neither speed nor delay; what matters is that this train moves steadily and calmly in the right direction. That is the prevailing and shared understanding between Iran and the Arab Republic of Egypt today.”

Lebanon and Iran’s Leverage

Against the backdrop of the regional opening encouraged by Cairo, Lebanon remains the most difficult test of the limits of Iranian diplomacy.

Hezbollah has emerged first from the war in Gaza and then the war with Iran in a severely weakened position, with diplomatic developments in recent weeks laying that reality bare. On June 26, Israel and the Lebanese government signed a US-sponsored framework agreement in Washington, marking the first direct negotiations between the two sides since 1983. Under the agreement, Beirut assumes responsibility for disarming Hezbollah in exchange for a gradual Israeli withdrawal. It also lends legitimacy to Israeli strikes targeting the group. Within hours of the announcement, Hezbollah Secretary-General Naim Qassem rejected the agreement, describing it as “surrender,” not peace.

Tehran, for its part, has not stood aside. Hours before this interview, Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi told a Lebanese delegation visiting Tehran for the funeral ceremonies that Iran would not resume negotiations with Washington unless Israeli military operations in Lebanon ceased, and would not sign any final agreement without complete Israeli withdrawal. The position sends a clear message to Washington that Lebanon is not a secondary issue to be addressed through a separate track that excludes Iran, but a central condition for any broader settlement. Whether this represents Tehran’s opening negotiating position or a genuine red line remains to be seen.

“This is part of our doctrine. The doctrine of the late Supreme Leader was founded on supporting the resistance. Iran’s constitution commits us to defending the oppressed everywhere in the world, not only Muslims. We defend Islamic holy sites, foremost among them Palestine. That is why we support the Palestinian resistance first, and then Lebanon. Lebanon is a red line for the Islamic Republic of Iran, and we will not cross that red line in any understanding or agreement with the United States.”

Where Is the Supreme Leader?

Lying behind these developments is an even more crucial question: who is really making the decisions in Tehran?

Mojtaba Khamenei was appointed Supreme Leader just days after the February strike that killed his father, mother, sister, brother-in-law and 14-month-old niece. The news came amid reports that the White House—and President Donald Trump personally—had objected to his succession, seeking to influence the selection of Iran’s next head of state.

Since then, the new Supreme Leader has not appeared in public even once. No confirmed photographs have been released, and his voice has been heard only through statements read by presenters on state television. Now, with the prospect of renewed war looming once again, the question of who truly holds decision-making authority in Iran has become far more than a matter of speculation, particularly as the US president openly vows to “finish the job.”

Mojtaba Khamenei is said to view negotiations with the United States as an option rather than a steadfast principle. Reports suggest that he held “a different view” on the peace agreement but ultimately allowed it to proceed after receiving assurances from senior officials, including the president, that they would assume responsibility for its outcome.

“The Supreme Leader is there. He was present at the funeral ceremonies in the capital, and photographs of the new Supreme Leader attending his father’s farewell were published. But both the Israeli entity and President Trump declared that they were capable of targeting Iran during the funeral period. Israel’s defense minister, Israel Katz, also said they had identified the new Supreme Leader and would target him in the coming days. So why should he appear publicly when his safety cannot be guaranteed?”

The Open Source Unit at Al Jazeera has called the photographs and videos circulating online purporting to show the new Supreme Leader not reliable. We expressed our surprise at Ferdosipour’s account, particularly since Mojtaba remained out of sight during the funeral while three of his brothers appeared publicly. The Iranian envoy reiterated his position.

“Those who appeared were indeed the Supreme Leader’s brothers. That is correct. But he himself was present in a private location. We can provide you with evidence of that. All of his brothers and all of the sons of the late Supreme Leader were present, even during the funeral prayers.”

He continued: “However, in accordance with security requirements, whether His Eminence the Supreme Leader appeared publicly was not a personal decision. The security authorities prevented him from doing so. He was present in a private location during the farewell ceremony, and there are photographs and distant video footage. The master of ceremonies also announced to the crowd that His Eminence the Supreme Leader was present on the platform above the prayer hall, pointed to the location, and said that he was there.”

Inside Iran

To understand the impact of the war on Iran, it is necessary to look back at the domestic situation in the weeks before it began. By late December, protests had spread from Tehran’s Grand Bazaar—where merchants closed their shops in protest against the collapse of the rial and inflation surpassing 50%—to 31 provinces across the country.

The death toll from the ensuing security crackdown remains disputed, with estimates suggesting that more than 3,000 people were killed. In January, Khamenei himself spoke with unusual candor, saying that several thousand people had died as a result of the unrest and foreign interference—not because of the actions of the security forces.

The war that broke out in late February confronted a government that had spent two months suppressing what appeared to be the early stages of a nationwide uprising. The economic pressures that had fueled those protests did not disappear simply because another crisis came to dominate the headlines.

“I want you to look again at what happened during the funeral processions inside Iran and beyond. Millions of Iranians took part. Around 20 million people were on the streets, in the summer. It was the largest referendum in the history of the world. Iranian civil society is sophisticated and educated. Reformists exist, principlists exist, conservatives exist, and every political current presents itself to the Iranian people, who then choose. The millions who attended the funeral amounted to a referendum of the highest order, and it changed the world’s perception of Iranian society and the Iranian state.”

The entire interview had originally been expected to revolve around a single figure: 60 days—the deadline Tehran and Washington gave themselves in Switzerland to turn their memorandum of understanding into a permanent agreement. The countdown began in the final week of June and, had events unfolded as planned, would have expired in mid-August.

But history has taken a different course. Today, no one in Cairo, Tehran or Washington can say with confidence whether the latest escalation represents a temporary setback that will eventually give way to another round of de-escalation, as previous crises have done, or whether it marked the moment when that 60-day deadline lost its meaning altogether.

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**Interview prepared for publication by Saher Ahmed.