Maritime fault lines: Libya’s gas diplomacy tests Egypt-Turkey thaw
Six years after Ankara and Tripoli signed a contentious maritime boundary agreement, the deal remains a flashpoint in the Eastern Mediterranean. Calls from Egypt and Greece to revoke the 2019 memorandum have reignited regional tensions, as questions over legitimacy, sovereignty, and energy access continue to divide key actors. The issue resurfaced in recent weeks when Aguila Saleh, Speaker of Libya’s House of Representatives, proposed launching a “direct and transparent dialogue” between Libya, Turkey, Egypt, and Greece to reach a consensual framework for maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean.
On Nov. 27, 2019, Turkey and Libya’s then-interim Government of National Accord (GNA) signed a memorandum of understanding on maritime boundary demarcation, a move that immediately escalated tensions between Ankara and Cairo. Less than a year later, in September 2020, Egypt announced the launch of the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) together with Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Israel, Jordan, and Palestine, deliberately excluding both Turkey and Libya from the emerging regional energy bloc.
Recent shifts around Eastern Mediterranean maritime boundaries reflect the deeper geopolitical divide between Turkey and Egypt, rooted in their opposing roles in Libya’s protracted civil war. Since the conflict’s eruption in 2014—pitting the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli against Khalifa Haftar’s Libyan National Army (LNA) in the east—Ankara has stood firmly behind the UN-recognized GNA, while Cairo has aligned itself with Haftar and his eastern coalition.
Maritime boundaries in the Eastern Mediterranean featured prominently in last week’s meeting between Khalifa Haftar and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi in Cairo. A joint statement released afterward emphasized the leaders’ commitment to continued cooperation “without causing harm, and in accordance with the rules of international law.”
Hafter in Cairo
Haftar’s visit came against the backdrop of renewed tensions between Libya and Greece, following a call by the Greek Parliament speaker to annul the 2019 Turkish-Libyan maritime memorandum during a meeting with Aguila Saleh. Athens argues that the agreement lacks legal validity—an assertion Tripoli views as a provocation and a violation of Libyan sovereignty.
The 2019 agreement between Ankara and the GNA—then led by Fayez al-Sarraj—granted Turkey extensive maritime rights to explore for hydrocarbon resources in the deeper waters of the Mediterranean. Cairo, however, has rejected the deal’s maritime claims, arguing that parts of the delineated zone encroach on Egypt’s exclusive economic zone. In response, Egypt unilaterally demarcated its western maritime boundary with Libya in 2022.
Tensions over Eastern Mediterranean maritime borders had largely subsided—until June, when the GNA referred the Turkish-Libyan memorandum to the House of Representatives for ratification. The move came amid a thaw in relations between Ankara and eastern Libyan factions, marked by visits to Turkey by Khalifa Haftar and LNA Deputy Commander Saddam Haftar. It also followed a shift in Egyptian-Turkish relations, which had previously posed a key obstacle to any serious advancement or ratification of the agreement.
That same month, Libya’s National Oil Corporationsigned an agreement with the Turkish Petroleum Corporation to carry out geological and geophysical surveys across four offshore sites within Libya’s territorial waters. The deal drew swift objections from Greece and Egypt, both of which filed formal complaints with the United Nations. Athens labeled the agreement illegal, accusing it of undermining Greece’s maritime and exploration rights. Cairo, for its part, denounced what it described as a Libyan attempt to legitimize gas exploration inside Egypt’s maritime zone.
Haftar’s most recent visit to Cairo must be read within the broader web of regional entanglements shaping the Eastern Mediterranean. It comes as GNA officials signal a renewed push to reopen dialogue on maritime boundaries with neighboring states. Within LNA-controlled eastern Libya, internal debates are still unfolding over whether to ratify the Ankara-Tripoli agreement—reflecting the fragmented political landscape and competing strategic calculations.
Egypt’s political calculus
Analysts speaking to Al Manassa suggest that Egypt’s recent maneuvers are driven by a strategic aim to consolidate its western maritime boundary and solidify its standing as a regional energy hub. This positioning is underpinned by border agreements with Greece and Cyprus, as well as a steady expansion of gas discoveries. At the same time, Cairo is actively working to preempt any Libyan-Turkish extensions that could threaten its maritime or geopolitical interests.
Karim Saeed, a researcher at the Al-Ahram Center for Political and Strategic Studies, underscored the political signaling behind El-Sisi and Haftar’s joint rejection of any encroachment on Egypt’s western maritime borders, citing the framework of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Speaking to Al Manassa, Saeed noted that Cairo is proactively engaging key Libyan stakeholders to reinforce its position on the issue.
Saeed added that Egypt’s growing opposition to Libya granting exploration rights to Turkish companies forms part of a broader strategy to safeguard its territorial claims in the Eastern Mediterranean. The goal, he explained, is to block any unilateral moves that could undermine Egypt’s regional influence or shift the geopolitical balance.
Turkey’s commercial aspirations
For Libyan leaders, maritime boundaries remain central to the country’s sovereignty. Yet amid deep internal fragmentation, many officials acknowledge that agreements struck under divided political authority risk becoming legal liabilities and flashpoints for future conflict. As a result, Libya is often inclined toward caution, favoring policy choices with tangible outcomes over moves that could trigger volatile political consequences.
“Despite ongoing debates over the 2019 agreement with Turkey, the memorandum still provides a political and security umbrella that the Tripoli-based government finds difficult to relinquish—especially given the fragility of internal power dynamics,” Libyan political analyst Khaled Al-Hijazi told Al Manassa. He pointed to a confluence of constraints: the absence of a unified executive authority with full domestic and international legitimacy, and the enduring reliance of rival Libyan factions on external alliances for political survival and security continuity.
Al-Hijazi noted that while Khalifa Haftar exercises significant geopolitical leverage—by virtue of controlling eastern Libya, swaths of coastline, and maintaining close ties with Cairo—he lacks the legal mandate to unilaterally sign or amend international maritime agreements. Any such action, he said, would clash with Tripoli’s strategic alignment with Ankara.
For Mustafa Salah, director of the Al-Shams Center for Strategic Research, the renewed turbulence over Eastern Mediterranean boundaries reflects Ankara’s bid to secure economic gains and expand geopolitical influence. By pushing to revive the 2019 memorandum, Turkey seeks to position itself as a counterweight to the Egyptian-Greek-Cypriot axis consolidated through the Eastern Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF) launched that same year.
Salah noted that the Mediterranean basin contains the world’s second-largest natural gas reserves—estimated at 300 trillion cubic feet—with EMGF member states collectively holding around 162 trillion cubic feet. Ankara’s exclusion from this framework, he argued, fuels its drive to redraw regional alignments through its partnership with Tripoli.
“Among the core objectives of the EMGF, which includes Jordan, Israel, and Palestine, is to sideline Turkey and limit its influence in the energy-rich Eastern Mediterranean,” Salah explained. He noted that Ankara’s refusal to recognize the existing maritime law framework stems from its rejection of granting Greece’s many islands full maritime jurisdiction—an arrangement Turkey argues would confine its territorial reach to its own coastline.
Karim Saeed, however, does not entirely dismiss the prospect of Turkish participation in the EMGF. He suggested that Ankara could eventually join the forum if it agrees to Egypt’s delineation of its western maritime boundaries, as established by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and recognizes Greece’s maritime rights.
The re-emergence of an Egyptian-Turkish rivalry
The latest tensions over maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean reflect the persistent geopolitical rivalry between Egypt and Turkey—fueled by unresolved disputes over competing interests in Libya, conflicting maritime claims, and Ankara’s continued exclusion from the EMGF. While Egyptian-Turkish relations have improved in recent months—partly in response to the war in Gaza and its wider regional implications—Libya’s maritime demarcation remains a key sticking point on the path toward full normalization.
According to Mustafa Salah, the failure to resolve Libya’s territorial and political fragmentation continues to obstruct meaningful progress. Effective management of the Libyan file, he argued, is essential not only for regional stability but also for reinforcing Egypt’s strategic position in the Eastern Mediterranean.
Salah noted that Cairo and Ankara have resolved many of the disputes that stagnated official relations for a decade after Turkey shifted its stance on supporting the Muslim Brotherhood and reined in media outlets attacking Egypt. Relations gradually moved from confrontation and unproductive negotiations toward a more pragmatic approach to diplomacy and navigating political differences.
Despite deep-seated tensions, Egypt and Turkey have found common ground on key regional issues. Alongside Qatar and the United States, both have played roles in de-escalating the conflict in Gaza by supporting ceasefire mediation efforts. They have also backed Sudan’s national army against the Rapid Support Forces in that country’s civil war. Yet Libya remains both an unresolved point of contention and a geopolitical testing ground—where Egypt insists on its unilateral interpretation of maritime law, while Turkey seeks to renegotiate the regional map through its agreement with Tripoli.
According to Al-Hijazi, the recent thaw in Egyptian-Turkish relations does not signal an end to tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Egypt continues to stand by its maritime agreements with Greece and Cyprus and is resolute in countering Turkish inroads via Libya. For Turkey, however, the 2019 maritime deal with Tripoli is central to its strategy to escape geographic marginalization in the Mediterranean. “The current rapprochement between Cairo and Ankara seems more about managing disagreements than resolving them,” Al-Hijazi said, cautioning that shifting power dynamics could reignite friction over maritime borders at any time.
Saeed, however, tempers concerns over an imminent rupture in Egyptian-Turkish relations, arguing that maritime disputes are unlikely to derail recent diplomatic gains. He points to a convergence of strategic interests: rising threats from Israel in the region, Turkey’s expanding influence in post-Assad Syria, and both nations’ backing of Sudan’s Transitional Sovereignty Council under Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan. These shared concerns, he suggests, are pushing Cairo and Ankara toward a more pragmatic, interest-driven engagement.
Still, the geography of the Eastern Mediterranean remains entangled in layered rivalries and overlapping claims, particularly among Egypt, Turkey, and Greece. For Libya, maritime borders represent not only a geopolitical fault line but one of the thorniest issues in its fractured political terrain. As Al-Hijazi concludes, unless Libya can transcend its internal divisions and form a unified executive authority capable of negotiating from a position of strength, maritime borders will continue to serve as tools for external pressure—rather than a doorway to resolution.