Iran’s dilemma is building an alternative, not toppling the regime, Asef Bayat says

Despite war, sanctions, and successive waves of protests, Iranian American sociologist Asef Bayat argues that Iran’s core problem is not whether the regime survives or falls, but the absence of a clear vision for what comes next.

The real challenge, he said, lies not only in mounting economic and social crises and external pressure, but in Iranians’ ability to build a political alternative capable of managing a transition without causing state collapse.

Bayat presented this view during a seminar organized by publisher Dar El-Maraya in downtown Cairo titled “The American-Zionist War on Iran and its repercussions,” where he discussed the trajectory of Iran’s political system since the revolution, the consequences of the recent war, and the future of protests and opposition movements in the country.

An expected tragedy

Bayat described what Iran experienced during the recent war as “tragic,” explaining during the nearly three-hour seminar that Iranians found themselves trapped between an authoritarian domestic authority and US-Israeli aggression in which civilians suffered the most.

He said the recent war had not come as a surprise, but was another chapter in a long-running conflict whose roots stretch back to the aftermath of the Iranian Revolution in 1979, when Tehran sought to counter US and Israeli pressure by building a network of regional allies and affiliated forces.

In that context, Bayat reviewed the history of tensions between Tehran and Washington, noting US support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War before the confrontation later expanded through Iran’s allies in Lebanon, Yemen, and Palestine.

He added that former US President George W. Bush placed Iran in what became known as the “Axis of Evil,” while Barack Obama’s presidency saw limited attempts at rapprochement before tensions escalated again under Donald Trump.

Bayat said Trump was not eager to enter a large-scale war because of his opposition to foreign military entanglements, but at the same time wanted to weaken Iran’s state infrastructure and strategic capabilities, particularly its nuclear program.

He added that Israel “used Al-Aqsa Flood to eliminate the Axis of Resistance” in the region, before shifting toward efforts to change the Iranian regime. Some assessments within Israel, he said, assumed that targeting Iran’s leadership could trigger mass protests or internal political change, “but that scenario did not materialize.”

Instead, Bayat said, Iranian society showed a degree of cohesion “in the face of external threats, even among sectors that oppose the authorities,” stressing that rejection of foreign intervention remained a decisive factor in public attitudes during the war.

Even so, he said the war and its aftermath contributed to a tightening security grip inside Iran, pointing to the arrest of hundreds of people on accusations of cooperating with Israel or harming national security.

Protesters attack mosques

Bayat argued that Iran’s internal crises are linked to the way resources and economic institutions are managed, combined with the absence of effective accountability and oversight mechanisms, which has intensified social pressures and driven broad sectors of society to demand change.

According to Bayat, Iran is facing harsh economic conditions marked by rising unemployment and inflation and declining purchasing power.

He said efforts to raise wages are constrained by employers’ inability to absorb higher labor costs amid continuing economic pressures, noting that inflation has reached about 60% by his estimate.

Bayat said the wave of economic protests that preceded the war was the broadest in recent years, cutting across classes and regions. He said it began among bazaar traders, historically one of the social groups aligned with the regime, before spreading to other classes and regions as economic conditions and living standards deteriorated.

He added that the protests drew participation from sections of the bourgeoisie, the middle class, workers, and poorer groups, highlighting the presence of what he called the “impoverished middle class,” people whose living conditions have eroded and who now face economic insecurity.

Bayat said the unrest included attacks on mosques and security facilities. While attacks on mosques may appear shocking, he said some protesters viewed them as part of the regime’s organizational and security structure, particularly because, according to him, they have been used to train loyalists in weapons use.

He added that authorities used security forces and pro-regime groups to suppress the protests, employing high levels of violence. While no verified death toll exists, estimates from rights groups and opposition organizations range from thousands to tens of thousands.

Iran’s future

Bayat said the name of former Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi emerged during those protests as a possible alternative to the regime, attracting some protesters not because they were convinced by his political project but because of the absence of other alternatives capable of mobilizing the public. He added that a significant portion of monarchist supporters are based outside Iran and that some of these groups count on Western support, particularly from the United States.

According to Bayat, some opponents believed foreign intervention could weaken the regime without imposing a heavy cost on civilians, but the recent war showed, in his view, that civilians were the main victims of military operations.

Bayat attributed the regime’s resilience, despite current conditions, to its revolutionary and ideological nature and to the institutions that emerged after the Iranian Revolution, including military and economic bodies that entrenched the regime’s presence within society.

He said the regime still has a social base that defends it and benefits from its survival. This support extends beyond officials and state employees to broader social and economic networks that may encompass as much as a quarter of Iran’s population.

At the same time, however, he argued that the regime will not be able to continue in its current form over the long term. He predicted new waves of protests and said the key question is not whether another uprising will occur, but who possesses a political project capable of filling the vacuum afterward and managing a post-regime transition if change comes.

He added that debate inside Iran no longer centers only on criticizing the regime or demanding its overthrow, but increasingly includes competing visions of what could follow. One of the main weaknesses of previous protest movements, he said, was the lack of a clear vision for the day after, with many protesters focused on removing the existing order without agreeing on an alternative or a transition mechanism.

In this context, Bayat proposed a gradual power transition rather than total collapse, arguing that some transformations may take the form of a “negotiated revolution,” in which accumulated pressure from society compels authorities to make concessions and enter a negotiating process that changes the system from within.

He cited the growing abandonment of mandatory hijab as an example of social change that gradually imposed itself despite official resistance.

Sixty-seven days after the United States and Iran began a series of talks mediated by Pakistan and backed by Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey, the two countries reached a framework agreement to halt the war that has been raging between them since late February. The deal includes ending military operations on all fronts, reopening the Strait of Hormuz, and lifting the US blockade on Iran. Israel quickly declared the agreement “non-binding” and reaffirmed its commitment to continuing military operations in Lebanon.

US President Donald Trump announced in the early hours of Monday morning on Truth Social that the agreement with Iran had been finalized, calling on ships around the world to “start your engines” and pass through the strait.