Jordan, Hamas, and the Muslim Brotherhood: A fractured alliance
This is not the first time Jordanian authorities have found themselves confronting both the Muslim Brotherhood/MB and Hamas. Nor is it the first time the two groups have faced accusations of launching hostile activities from Jordanian territory. The triangular relationship between Jordanian authorities, the Brotherhood, and Hamas has been intertwined and fraught with tension since the closure of Hamas offices in Amman in 1999, just months after King Abdullah II ascended to the throne.
In the years that followed, political crises and mutual accusations continued among the three parties, but they had never escalated to the level seen this April 24, when Jordan banned the MB and seized its assets after accusing a Hamas-affiliated cell of plotting to carry out "sabotage operations."
So why now?
The latest case appears to be part of the ongoing series of confrontations between Jordan and the Brotherhood. However, it cannot be fully understood without considering two overlapping factors: an intense regional shift and heightened internal tensions.
Regionally, Palestinian resistance forces, especially Hamas, are under unprecedented pressure in Gaza amid the dismantling of the so-called "axis of resistance." Efforts led by the United States and Israel, with European and Arab diplomatic support, have increasingly focused on disarming Palestinian resistance groups as a prerequisite for ending the Israeli war on Gaza. Jordan has found itself in the heart of this regional storm, where old alliances and rivalries—especially its complex ties with Hamas and the Brotherhood—are being reshaped.
Internally, the crackdown comes amid a surge in pro-Gaza protests following the Al-Aqsa Flood operation and the Israeli genocidal war on Gaza. The Brotherhood central role in mobilizing Jordanian public support for Palestine, revitalized the group that had been weakened and divided. They went on to secure 31 parliamentary seats challenging the monarchy by proposing a bill to criminalize dealings with Israel and by advocating for considering the Islamic law in establishing the Jordanian National Commission for Women.
The government's swift response carried a wave of arrests targeting protest leaders, a move widely interpreted as an effort to contain the Brotherhood’s rising influence and preempt its efforts to leverage the Palestinian cause for domestic political advantage.
Amid mounting regional pressures and domestic unrest, the intricate relationship among Hamas, the Brotherhood, and Jordan is undergoing a fundamental redefinition.
An independent offspring
The MB established its presence in Jordan in 1945. After Jordan annexed the West Bank in 1950, the Brotherhood expanded its activities into the new territory. The annexation—known as the "union of the two banks"—joined the East Bank (today’s Jordan) with the West Bank. This political shift unified the Brotherhood’s Jordanian and Palestinian branches into a single organizational structure.
Meanwhile, in Gaza, which was then under Egyptian administration, a separate Palestinian branch of the Brotherhood was established under the leadership of Sheikh Omar Sawan. This branch operated locally until the landscape shifted dramatically after 1967. It was then that the Palestinian Islamic project began to take on its distinct identity, although it remained ideologically and organizationally intertwined with the broader Brotherhood movement.
Despite volatile conditions, Brotherhood members in both the East and West Banks engaged in resistance efforts. In the late 1960s, they established “Shyoukh Camps” in the Jordan Valley in cooperation with Fatah, seeking to build a structured jihadist presence. This experiment ended abruptly with the Black September conflict in 1970. Afterwards, the Brotherhood shifted its focus to religious preaching, education, and social work, avoiding direct armed engagement within Jordan.
In 1978, "the Levant Organization" was founded, encompassing MB members from Jordan, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon. Within this framework, a "Palestine Section" was created within to specifically address Palestinian affairs. This integration reflected a firm belief in the unity of the struggle, the leadership, and the Islamic project despite varying political geographies.
This arrangement persisted until the outbreak of the First Intifada in 1987. That December, MB leaders in Gaza announced the formation of Hamas, led by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin. Conceived as an independent resistance movement; Hamas drew on the MB’s ideological foundations while departing from its traditional methods.
Initially, Hamas' charter explicitly described itself as "one of the wings of the MB in Palestine." For Jordanian Brotherhood members, Hamas was not a foreign entity but a natural extension of their own, and a long-held aspiration to fuse faith and armed resistance.
However, in its amended 2017 charter, Hamas presented itself as an "Islamic Palestinian national liberation and resistance movement," without mentioning any organizational ties to the MB locally or globally.
To Wadi Araba
When Hamas emerged during the First Intifada, it did not appear out of thin air. Instead, it was the result of years of organizational and ideological groundwork laid by the Brotherhood in both Palestine and Jordan. Early on, logistical, financial, and human support from the Jordanian Brotherhood was a critical lifeline for Hamas. This support included donations, networks of professional associations and charities, and the creation of a safe space that enabled the movement to establish its foundations.
At that time, there was little distinction between the Brotherhood in Jordan and Palestine. The project was unified, the vision was shared, and the literature was common.
Meanwhile, the Jordanian state maintained a delicate balance through implicitly allowing Hamas a limited political and media presence in Amman, while never formally acknowledging the group. This cautious openness reflected strategic calculation rather than support for Hamas.
Until its disengagement from the West Bank in 1988, Jordan had not recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization/PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Instead, it sought to preserve influence in Palestinian affairs, including over the Islamic movement.
However, after Jordan formally joined the peace process and signed the Wadi Araba Treaty with Israel in 1994, it faced new diplomatic and security obligations. The Jordanian government’s approach towards Hamas and the Brotherhood began to shift accordingly.
Hamas also rejected the Oslo Accords signed between Israel and the PLO in 1993, viewing them as a betrayal of the Palestinian cause—a stance shared by the Jordanian Brotherhood. Both saw peace deals such as Camp David and Wadi Araba as legitimizing occupation and undermining core Palestinian rights. This shared rejection initially strengthened the bond between Hamas and the Brotherhood, fostering a climate of mobilization against the Jordanian government's policies.
However, subtle differences in methods started to emerge. The first public sign of this divergence came in 1995, when Jordanian authorities asked Moussa Abu Marzouk, then head of Hamas' political bureau, to leave the country. Reports suggest the decision came after direct U.S. and Israeli pressure, with Jordanian officials warning Abu Marzouk that his presence had become "a burden."
Abu Marzouk eventually left for the United States, where he was later arrested, marking the beginning of an increasingly strained relationship between Hamas and the Jordanian state. This incident signaled the gradual shrinking of the political space that Hamas had once enjoyed in Jordan, and during this confrontation, the MB opted for caution, choosing to maintain a low profile.
An Israeli antidote
On September 25, 1997, everything changed. Israel's Mossad attempted to assassinate Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal in the heart of Amman by injecting him with a lethal toxin. The operation, almost a scene from a spy thriller, quickly escalated into an unprecedented diplomatic and security crisis.
Meshaal fell into a coma, triggering widespread outrage across Jordan. King Hussein, angered by the blatant violation of Jordanian sovereignty, moved swiftly. He imposed strict conditions on Israel: deliver the antidote to save Meshaal’s life and release Hamas spiritual leader Sheikh Ahmed Yassin from Israeli prison, in exchange for the release of the captured Mossad agents.
Israel yielded. Meshaal recovered, and Yassin was freed and greeted in Amman as a hero.
The crisis delivered Hamas a resounding moral victory and revived its standing across the Arab world. King Hussein also emerged domestically as a defender of Jordanian sovereignty and, symbolically, of Palestinian resistance.
Yet behind the scenes, Jordanian intelligence agencies had begun rethinking their relationship with Hamas. Officials increasingly saw Hamas’ activities in Amman not as mere political representation, but as the establishment of a real organizational base for recruitment, funding, and mobilization.
No severed ties
Despite political rifts and rising tensions with the state, the ideological bond between Hamas and Jordan's MB remained strong. Their differences were not over principles but rather over the political positioning of each party within Jordan.
The two movements shared a steadfast ideological lineage rooted in the vision articulated by the MB founder Hassan Al-Banna: the implementation of Islamic law, the rejection of secularism, and the aspiration to establish an Islamic state, even if achieved gradually through political participation and institutional reform.
Hamas consistently affirmed its place within this framework, describing itself as "Brotherhood-spirited and goal-oriented." The Jordanian Brotherhood, for its part, viewed Hamas not merely as an ally but as the militant embodiment of its broader ideological and political mission.
The relationship endured beyond public view. Coordination persisted across multiple levels, including organizational meetings, personnel exchanges, and charitable associations affiliated with the Brotherhood that channeled support to Hamas activities in Gaza under the guise of humanitarian work.
The two movements' discourses largely converged. Both framed Palestine as the central cause of the Islamic nation and adopted nearly identical slogans, despite differences in operational contexts and methods.
Despite their ideological rigidity, both Hamas and the Brotherhood demonstrated notable political pragmatism. The Brotherhood participated in Jordanian parliamentary and union elections, while Hamas contested Palestinian elections and ultimately assumed control of Gaza without abandoning their core principles.
Between the late 1980s and 1999, coordination between the two movements reached its zenith. They collaborated on fundraising campaigns, organized political tours—including those for Sheikh Ahmed Yassin—and launched solidarity efforts in support of Brotherhood causes within Jordan. Though often discreet, the partnership remained dynamic and resilient.
The major rupture
In February 1999, King Hussein of Jordan passed away, and King Abdullah II ascended the throne. By August of the same year, the Jordanian authorities seized the opportunity of Hamas leaders traveling to Tehran to storm the movement's offices in Amman, arresting 16 members and shutting down its operations entirely. The government then officially declared Hamas a banned organization.
When Khaled Mashaal and Ibrahim Ghusheh returned to Jordan in September, they were immediately arrested. Shortly after, they were released and deported to Qatar, accompanied by members of Hamas' politburo Izzat Al-Rishq and Sami Khater.
The government justified its crackdown by claiming that documents found in Hamas offices revealed activities beyond mere political representation, including recruitment, stockpiling equipment, and forging travel documents. Prime Minister Abdul Raouf Al-Rawabdeh—himself a former Brotherhood member in his youth—stated that Hamas' operations had spiraled beyond control, and even the Brotherhood could no longer contain them.
This marked the end of Hamas' public presence in Jordan and the beginning of a long period of official rupture, lasting over a decade.
Yet the Second Intifada, which erupted in 2000, catapulted Hamas back into the spotlight as a formidable force of resistance, boosting its popularity throughout the Arab world—including Jordan. Within Jordanian Brotherhood circles, Hamas' military prowess in Gaza and the West Bank was celebrated as a natural extension of the broader Islamist project.
However, public sympathy did not translate into official recognition. Jordan maintained its ban, prohibiting Hamas from engaging in political or organizational activity within the kingdom. Even after Hamas' electoral victory in the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, which gave it a majority and the right to govern the Palestinian territories, Amman did not revise its position.
From where do we fire?
Despite the deep ideological alignment and long-standing organizational ties between Hamas and the Jordanian Brotherhood, tensions and disputes began to surface intermittently throughout the 1990s. Some remained behind closed doors, while others erupted into public view during critical moments. Following the 1999 crackdown, these disagreements became increasingly pronounced.
The key difference lay in their respective functional structures: Hamas operated as an armed resistance movement, while the Jordanian MB functioned as a political and social organization committed to peaceful activism within Jordanian law. This divergence became particularly stark when Hamas intensified its armed operations against Israel during the 1990s, while the Jordanian Brotherhood prioritized political engagement and avoided any association with violence.
Some Brotherhood leaders expressed concern that Hamas' military activities could jeopardize the MB's legal and political standing within Jordan, specially if it was accused of providing political cover to a group operating against neighboring countries. Reports suggest that heated debates occurred within both Hamas and Brotherhood circles. Leaders of Hamas' "interior" branches in Gaza and the West Bank occasionally advocated for calming military operations, while the "exterior" leadership, based in Amman—including Khaled Mashaal, Musa Abu Marzouk, and Ibrahim Ghusheh—insisted on maintaining armed resistance.
This internal rift foreshadowed the Jordanian state's later accusations that Hamas had crossed red lines by allegedly planning operations from Jordanian soil.
Following the 1999 raids on Hamas offices, Jordanian authorities claimed to have uncovered documents detailing military training activities, stockpiling of equipment, recruitment efforts within refugee camps and universities, and use of forged passports.
Although the Brotherhood attempted to contain the crisis and distance itself publicly from Hamas' activities, many within its leadership felt betrayed. The Jordan Times quoted an Islamist leader as saying, "Many Brotherhood members felt that Hamas deceived them. They had vouched for Hamas, but Hamas crossed the lines."
Jordanian MP Osama Al-Malkawi even declared publicly, "The Hamas leadership was repeatedly warned to maintain a low profile in Jordan. They refused, violating the trust and hospitality they were offered."
Zaki Bani Irshid, former Secretary-General of the Islamic Action Front, later confirmed that Jordanian intelligence had exploited these rifts. Some MB leaders, alarmed by the situation, urged Hamas to leave Jordan and reassessed, for the first time, whether unwavering support for armed resistance was still a viable strategy.
This marked a pivotal moment: the Brotherhood, implicitly if not publicly, began to distance itself from Hamas' methods to protect its own survival in Jordan's tightening political environment.
The Brotherhood's spring and its autumn
The situation remained largely unchanged until the Arab Spring in 2011, which briefly brought the MB to power in Egypt before it was overthrown. This development sent shockwaves across Islamist movements in the region, including Jordan.
Before the Brotherhood’s downfall in Egypt, a thaw appeared between Jordan and Hamas. In 2012, under Qatari mediation, Khaled Mashaal visited Amman and met with King Abdullah II for the first time since his expulsion. Although largely symbolic and politically constrained, the meeting signaled Jordan’s cautious willingness to reengage with Hamas, particularly as the movement’s influence in Gaza grew and the Palestinian Authority’s standing declined.
Nonetheless, Jordanian authorities remained deeply wary. They emphasized that the meetings did not amount to formal political recognition of Hamas, nor did they permit the group to reestablish an organizational presence within the kingdom.
At the same time, the Jordanian government moved to restructure its relationship with Islamist movements internally. In 2016, it revoked the MB’s legal status and facilitated the creation of the Society of the Muslim Brothers instead, led by Abdul Majid Thuneibat, a former Brotherhood leader, as the newly recognized official entity.
These measures reflected mounting concerns that the Brotherhood’s enduring ties to Hamas—both ideological and material—threatened Jordan’s internal stability, particularly as regional dynamics shifted with the emergence of a new "Arab moderation axis." This informal coalition, comprising states such as Jordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, prioritized regional stability, opposed political Islam, and advocated diplomatic engagement with Israel.
Although Hamas' offices in Amman remained closed, back-channel communications persisted through political figures and tribal intermediaries, as confirmed by Ibrahim Ghusheh, a former Hamas spokesman.
At the grassroots level, Hamas retained significant popular support, particularly in cities such as Zarqa, Irbid, and the Baqaa refugee camp. However, this sympathy failed to translate into political power, constrained by government crackdowns on Islamist activism and compounded by the Brotherhood’s internal fragmentation.
Hawks and doves
Since the 1990s, the Jordanian Brotherhood had been steadily redefining its political and social discourse to align more closely with national priorities. The group increasingly emphasized political reform, parliamentary participation, and union activism, presenting itself as a "national reformist movement" that balanced internal advocacy with steadfast support for the Palestinian cause.
The relationship with Hamas energized the Brotherhood’s grassroots base but came at significant political and organizational cost.
For Hamas, the bond with the Jordanian Brotherhood provided legitimacy and logistical support, particularly during the formative years of armed resistance. For the Brotherhood, however, the relationship became an increasing liability, drawing heightened security scrutiny and exacerbating internal divisions.
A visible split emerged within the Brotherhood’s ranks. Leaders and cadres of Palestinian origin, generally more emotionally aligned with Hamas, formed what came to be known as the "hawks." Jordanian-origin leaders—the "doves"—expressed growing concern that the Brotherhood was losing its national identity and becoming overly entangled with Hamas’ regional agenda.
These tensions surfaced publicly between 2013 and 2016, as internal splits and defections reshaped the Brotherhood’s political landscape.
The Brotherhood’s association with Hamas fueled a surge in popular support, especially during the two Palestinian intifadas. Yet it also imposed a heavy political burden, subjecting the organization to constant pressure from the Jordanian state. In the 1990s, Hamas stood as a powerful symbol of resistance for the Brotherhood and a source of broad public sympathy, particularly among Jordanians of Palestinian descent.
Yet this closeness came at a price. After the 1999 crackdown on Hamas, the Brotherhood's public silence was seen by many of its supporters as an act of betrayal. Meanwhile, Hamas interpreted the Brotherhood’s retreat as a painful abandonment.
From that moment on, the relationship between the two movements shifted from an organic partnership to a more cautious, symbolic solidarity.
Under increasing state pressure, the Brotherhood was forced to strike a difficult balance—maintaining its ideological commitment to the Palestinian cause while avoiding direct confrontation with the Jordanian regime.
This balancing act fueled further internal divisions. One faction insisted that unwavering support for Hamas was a moral and political obligation, while another argued that the Brotherhood should prioritize domestic reform and sever external entanglements.
Thus, the relationship with Hamas evolved from a source of empowerment to a point of contention, opening the Brotherhood to accusations of dual loyalty at a time when political space was shrinking and popular frustration was demanding new, more pragmatic alternatives.
Did Hamas' guns rise?
In recent years, suspicions about Hamas’ military activities inside Jordan have resurfaced, coinciding with escalating regional tensions and ongoing confrontations between Palestinian resistance factions and the Israeli occupation.
These suspicions are not unfounded; they are rooted in complex security files and field developments that have triggered serious concerns within Jordanian official circles.
The most recent incident involved the dismantling of a Brotherhood-affiliated cell, which led directly to the decision to ban the group. The accused members faced charges of "undermining national security, inciting chaos, and plotting acts of sabotage." Allegations included manufacturing homemade rockets, importing components from abroad, stockpiling explosives, and even constructing a drone project.
This was not the first time such accusations surfaced. Jordan had previously charged individuals linked to Hamas with similar offenses. Yet despite the recurrence of these cases, there is still no conclusive evidence that Hamas has established a formal military wing inside Jordan akin to Al-Qassam Brigades in Gaza or the cells it later formed in southern Lebanon.
No recorded attacks have ever been launched from Jordanian soil against Israel or any other target, even during major escalations in Gaza or Lebanon.
Through interviews with senior Hamas sources and first-tier Brotherhood cadres, a consistent narrative emerges: Hamas has avoided building a structured military apparatus in Jordan out of respect for longstanding understandings with the Jordanian authorities, which prohibit the use of Jordan as a base for military action.
However, these sources also acknowledge that individual initiatives—driven by zealous youth from Brotherhood backgrounds—have occasionally attempted to smuggle arms to the West Bank. Such operations, they say, were often linked to the late Saleh Al-Arouri, Hamas’ deputy political chief, who was assassinated in Beirut’s southern suburbs in early 2024.
On the other hand, Jordanian security reports and media leaks have pointed to "unorganized military activity" involving the recruitment of cells and the facilitation of weapons smuggling to Palestinian territories.
Much of this alleged activity was attributed to Arouri, who, after relocating from Turkey to Lebanon, allegedly oversaw efforts to cultivate networks within Jordan’s Palestinian refugee camps. Although Arouri consistently denied orchestrating any operations inside Jordan, Jordanian intelligence remained deeply skeptical.
Following the 2023-2024 escalation, new intelligence suggested that Arouri had, at minimum, indirectly supported recruitment initiatives among MB sympathizers in Jordan.
Facing these allegations, Hamas repeatedly denied any formal involvement, stressing that "Jordan is a country we respect, and we have no intention of interfering in its internal affairs." Nevertheless, Hamas has not ruled out the possibility that individual activists may have acted out of personal initiative, fueled by anger over Israeli assaults on Gaza and the West Bank.
This dual stance—denial coupled with implicit acknowledgment of rogue elements—reflects what could be described as a policy of "responsible denial," leaving Hamas room to distance itself institutionally while sympathizing morally with such acts.
Meanwhile, the Jordanian government has pursued a quiet but firm policy: avoiding public escalation with Hamas while maintaining a zero-tolerance approach to any security breaches. Officials have repeatedly emphasized that Jordan will not allow its territory to be dragged into regional conflicts, regardless of the cause.
This delicate balancing act has so far enabled Jordan to maintain internal stability without officially severing ties with the Palestinian resistance camp—a fragile but enduring equilibrium.
War on Gaza
The relationship between Hamas and Jordan’s MB was never merely an organizational or ideological overlap. It reflected a deeper entanglement between Jordan’s national identity and the broader Palestinian struggle.
Since the closure of Hamas’ offices in Amman in 1999, the Jordanian government has treated Hamas as an entity "outside the acceptable framework," while the Brotherhood has carefully walked a tightrope between loyalty to Jordanian sovereignty and solidarity with Palestinian resistance.
At the societal level, Palestinian-Jordanians—whether politically active or not—have never been fully detached from their cause. They are not merely refugees living in a host country; they are the living continuation of a forcibly uprooted geography and identity. Their presence has shaped Jordan’s demographic makeup, political landscape, and even its security calculations.
Thus, whenever Palestinian activism within Jordan is labeled as terrorism or incitement, it echoes a broader security discourse often infused with an Israeli narrative, localized through Jordanian mechanisms. This narrative attempts to strip Palestinian identity of its political and resistance dimensions.
The contradiction becomes stark when comparing the muted official response to repeated Israeli incursions into Al-Aqsa Mosque—under Jordan’s custodianship—with the fierce crackdowns against Jordanian protesters, or even those expressing solidarity with Palestine online.
Ultimately, the issue extends beyond Hamas. It encompasses the broader Palestinian-Jordanian community, which often finds itself trapped—expected to remain silent and neutral while witnessing supplies shipped from Jordanian ports to fuel the very war machines devastating Gaza.
They are not merely victims of protracted displacement, but also of enforced political alienation—a deliberate effort to keep them outside the conversation, outside decision-making, and outside the realm of permitted outrage.
(*)A version of this article first appeared in Arabic on April 26, 2025